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1 Introduction 
 
We must use what has been called ‘smart power’, the full range of tools at our disposal – 
diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – picking the right tool or 
combination of tools for each situation. 
 
US Foreign Secretary Hilary Clinton in her confirmation hearing on January 13
th
 2009 
(Clinton 2009). 
 
By referring to the term „smart power‟ thirteen times in her confirmation hearing, Ms. 
Clinton certainly contributed to popularizing it (See for example Benen/The 
Washington Monthly, January 13, 2009; CBS News, January 13, 2009; Fox News, 
January 22, 2009; or Hertzberg/The New Yorker, January 26, 2009). Being of 
somewhat disputed origin, the term was probably first used by Nossel (2004), but it is 
usually associated with Joseph S. Nye Jr., who defines it as “the ability to combine 
hard and soft power into a winning strategy” (Nye/The Boston Globe, August 19, 
2006).
1
 While „hard power‟ basically connotes military, economic or demographic 
strength (Mearsheimer 2001), „soft power‟ often rests on intangible assets and is 
roughly understood as the ability to attract and persuade (Nye 1990, 2004). This will 
all be discussed in more detail later. For now, it suffices to stress that smart power 
remains an ambiguous academic concept, as illustrated quite well by the director of 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Michael Clarke, stating that “it means 
everything and nothing” (Clarke 2010). Consequently, Nye (2007: 172) calls on 
researchers to “go beyond sterile debates (…) and to look carefully at particular cases 
that can illuminate how to integrate hard and soft power”. This thesis takes Nye at his 
word and will argue that Taiwan under current president Ma Ying-jeou represents such 
a case. 
 
                                              
1
 Nye is a co-founder of the international relations (IR) theory neoliberalism, and he is also the one who coined 
the term „soft power‟ in the early 1990s. A 2008 survey conducted by Teaching, Research and International 
Policy (TRIP) at The College of William and Mary ranked him the most influential scholar on American foreign 
policy over the last 20 years. 
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Taiwan‟s status and prospects are often analyzed mainly in the context of China-US 
relations (Bush & O‟Hanlon 2007; Mearsheimer 2001: 372-377; Romberg 2003; and 
Tunsjø 2008). Indeed, there are good reasons for choosing this framework. First – on 
the most basic level – Taiwan obviously dwarfs compared to China and the US, and 
International Relations (IR) theory tends to focus predominantly on great powers (Fox 
1959: 1-2; Handel 1990: 3-4; Mathisen 1971; Neumann & Gstöhl 2006: 22-23). 
Second – from an historical perspective – the controversy that has come to surround 
Taiwan has to a large extent been shaped by Sino-US relations (Bush 2004, 2005; and 
Tunsjø 2008). Third – drawing on recent developments – the contemporary importance 
of Sino-US relations is increasing both regionally and globally as a result of China‟s 
rapid rise, having obvious implications for Taiwan (Carpenter 2008: 155-183; Cohen 
2010: 263-292; and The Economist 2009). 
 
Against this backdrop, the following analysis of the Taiwan issue is interesting: 
 
What happens if China becomes big and powerful and doesn‟t own Taiwan? At some point 
they‟re probably going to use military force to take Taiwan, and it may be the case that (…) 
the United State say[s], “That is unacceptable,” and go[es] to war on behalf of Taiwan 
(Mearsheimer/Conversations with History 2002: part 6). 
 
Uncontroversial and straightforward as this analysis arguably is, the point is that it 
leaves Taiwan powerless to the extent that it is not even mentioned as an actor in „its 
own conflict‟. In other words, it appears that Taiwan is not regarded capable of 
influencing the turn of events in one way or the other. However, despite obvious 
factors suggesting that Taiwan‟s „elbowroom‟ is severely limited by strong interests 
and deep involvement from the world‟s two greatest powers – or rather because of 
these factors – this thesis wishes to investigate whether, and to what extent, Taiwan‟s 
elbowroom is still sufficient in terms of allowing it to determine its own future.
2
 The 
core research question, then, asks: 
                                              
2
 Elbowroom is certainly an ambiguous term, and it is used in this thesis mainly because of its figurative 
connotations. That is, while more commonly used terms like „space‟ or „room of maneuver‟ arguably convey 
more or less the same meaning, they still strike the author as somewhat static. That is, while space sounds like 
something you might have (or not), elbowroom sounds like something you might create (or lose). 
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How does Taiwan’s hard and soft power interplay (smart power) to define its 
elbowroom as an independent actor capable of determining its own future? 
 
1.1 Some basics I: China and the US 
 
Elbowroom cannot logically exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is created (or lost) vis-à-vis 
something. In Taiwan‟s case, this „something‟ consists essentially of China and the US 
(as explained above), and since both of these great powers play such an important part 
in defining the scope of Taiwan‟s elbowroom, it is necessary to start by laying out their 
basic interests and positions – in order to see what Taiwan is up against, so to say. 
 
According to the People‟s Republic of China (PRC/China), Taiwan is an inseparable 
part of PRC territory, and when it comes to this fundamental claim, Beijing is as 
uncompromising today as it has been since the founding of the PRC in 1949 (PRC 
Constitution 1982; PRC white paper 1993; PRC white paper 2003). In other words, 
there cannot be two Chinas (one PRC and one Republic of China (ROC)), there cannot 
be one China and one Taiwan, and the only legitimate government of (all of) China is 
the PRC. In government rhetoric, this view is typically based on legal claims 
concerning China‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as symbolic arguments 
about not allowing Chinese historical unity to be broken. 
 
In addition, a range of pragmatic considerations and strategic incentives certainly play 
an important role in upholding China‟s unwillingness to yield ground. Factors worth 
mentioning include fear of a separatist domino effect spreading to Tibet and Xinjiang 
(See for example Wong/The New York Times, January 20, 2009), concerns related to 
having a US ally just off the China coast (See for example PRC government website, 
January 26, 2010), the role that Taiwan plays as a common symbolic cause providing 
legitimacy for the Chinese government (Friedman 2006: xxii-xxiii; and Hughes 1997), 
and finally, the issue of maritime territorial claims (Nordhaug 2001; and Tønnesson 
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2000). 
 
Perhaps more relevant for the purpose here are the specific policies that these claims 
and considerations foster. In this regard, the so-called „One-China policy‟ along with 
the 2005 „Anti secession law‟ (ASL) are of particular importance. The former refers to 
China‟s policy of demanding that all its diplomatic allies acknowledge the PRC as the 
sole legitimate government of (all of) China, and thus refrain from seeking relations 
with the ROC. This policy also involves denying – or at least seriously restricting – 
Taiwanese access to international organizations. As for the ASL, it states that China 
sees itself as entitled to “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to 
protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (ASL: Article 8). In this way, it 
prepares legal ground for taking military action against Taiwan, should they pursue de 
jure independence (see below). 
 
As mentioned already, such policies are undoubtedly quite uncompromising in nature. 
However, as Moody (2007) and Romberg (China Leadership Monitor, no. 23, 2008a: 
2-7) both illustrate by historically laying out the development of major trends in 
Beijing‟s position, it is important to note that although fundamental claims are clearly 
not subject to compromise, this does not mean that China‟s entire Taiwan policy is 
written in stone. In other words, China‟s Taiwan policies are neither set indefinitely, 
nor made in a vacuum, and hence, they might be more flexible – and thus open to 
influence from Taiwan – than they appear at first glance. 
 
Turning now briefly to the US‟ position, Redd (2007) sums up its policy since the 
1970s as one aspiring to build better relations with China, while at the same time 
preventing it from taking over Taiwan by force.
3
 Importantly, however, this is not to 
say that the US supports Taiwanese independence. On the contrary, the US 
“acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
                                              
3
 US policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and China is mainly grounded in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (which is 
US national law), the 1982 Six Assurances to Taiwan and the 1972/1979/1982 Three Joint Communiqués 
between the US and China. For a well arranged discussion about these documents (and their current relevance), 
see Romberg (China Leadership Monitor, no. 31, 2010a).  
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one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, [and] does not challenge that position” 
(1
st
 Joint Communiqué: 12). In essence, these somewhat conflicting aspirations of the 
US have resulted in a policy of „strategic ambiguity‟ (Carpenter 2008: 158; Hickey 
2008; and Tucker 2005). By not clarifying its exact intentions – most importantly 
related to whether or not it would intervene in a military confrontation – the US keeps 
all options open, while maintaining what we might call a „leverage of the unsaid‟. 
 
Clearly, then, the US is balancing on a narrow edge. On the one hand, as China rapidly 
emerges as a powerful global actor, the US does not want to upset Sino-US relations, 
and certainly does not want to get involved in a resource-demanding military 
engagement in the Taiwan Strait.
4
 On the other hand, however, the US is deeply 
committed to Taiwan‟s security.5 Consequently, the US‟ most basic interest is to 
uphold cross-strait peace and stability – that is, to maintain the status quo. 
 
Hickey (2008), Redd (2007) and Tucker (2005) all point out how US policy has shown 
to be highly consistent over the years. However, as noted above in relation to the 
policies of China, it is important to stress that being consistent should not be confused 
with being static or inflexible. Illustratively, Tunsjø (2008) explores US Taiwan 
policies as a „shifting discursive construct‟ that is continuously shaped by external as 
well as internal factor. Arguably, this opens up for Taiwanese influence. 
 
In sum, China wants reunification, while the US wants to maintain status quo. Put 
differently, both China and the US play important roles in defining Taiwan‟s 
elbowroom, and against this backdrop, time is now probably overripe to look closer at 
the basics of the latter‟s position. 
 
                                              
4
 Illustratively, some voices in the US suggest that the US‟ commitment to Taiwan‟s security is outdated, like for 
example Senator Dianne Feinstein in June this year (Taipei Times, July 4, 2010; and Waldron/China Brief, 
October 22, 2010). 
5
 To be sure, this commitment will be addressed in much detail later.  
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1.2 Some basics II: Taiwan 
 
According to Wang (2006: 150), Taiwan is “the most prominent of a handful of „de 
facto states‟”, which by Pegg (1998: 5) is defined in comparison to quasi-states: “The 
quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is 
illegitimate no matter how effective it is.” In fact, Taiwan meets all basic criteria that 
are commonly used to define a state.
6
 However, because of China‟s strict policies (as 
outlined above), it remains isolated in the international community, largely lacking 
diplomatic recognition and organizational representation – hence the important 
distinction between de facto and de jure independence (Tsang 2008:1-4).
7
 
 
However, along the same lines as the above remarks about Chinese and US policies, 
international status and recognition is not eternally fixed (Tunsjø 2008). In this regard, 
the PRC replacing the ROC in the UN in 1971 serves as an obvious illustration. 
Besides, to complicate the issue even further, it is important to note from the beginning 
that Taiwan‟s end goal is arguably as ambiguous as its political status, since Taiwanese 
public opinion includes the full range of views from strong advocates of unification 
with China, to equally determined supporters of de jure independence.
8
 Therefore, the 
elbowroom under investigation could be understood as Taiwan‟s capability to bide 
time and accumulate leverage, thus preventing China and the US from resolving and 
settling the issue without Taiwanese consent.  
 
                                              
6
 The 1933 “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” is the most commonly used reference in 
this regard. It puts forward four basic criteria of statehood, that is (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined 
territory, (3) government, and (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention: 1). 
7
 As of November 2010, Taiwan has 23 diplomatic allies, mostly small states in Africa, South America and the 
Pacific. For a full list, see ROC MoFA website at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=32618&CtNode=1865&mp=6. In terms of membership in 
international organizations, see ROC MoFA website at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/811511552371.pdf for a full list. (There is always a controversy 
revolving around what name Taiwan should use when joining international organizations. „Chinese Taipei‟ is 
often chosen.) 
8
 There are numerous polls depicting this development, and in (very) general terms, the majority of Taiwanese 
usually seem to agree that any final solution is still premature. One recent poll can be found at 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114&anum=8579.  
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1.3 Elbowroom: military, economic and political leverage 
 
The above undoubtedly paints a rather gloomy picture of Taiwan‟s situation, and 
current developments do not necessarily give rise to optimism. In short, while the 
cross-strait military and economic balance is shifting rapidly in China's favor, 
international political recognition of Taiwan seems distant at best. Based on a 
combination of these factors, several observers have expressed concern that Taiwan is 
being increasingly marginalized, and some suggest that it is facing „finlandization‟ 
(See Chang/Eurasia Review, June 9, 2010).
9
 Accordingly, Friedman (2006: xix) states 
bluntly that “Taiwan is too weak to control its international destiny”. 
 
What‟s more, the same combination of factors also creates the backdrop against which 
Taiwan and President Ma‟s elbowroom should be analyzed. After Mr. Ma and the 
KMT took power in 2008 on a platform promising to ease tensions with China and 
promote closer cooperation, cross-strait tension has eased significantly, both 
rhetorically and in terms of concrete policy changes. This rapprochement represents a 
strong break with the presidency of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which 
Taiwan followed an independence course that not only brought about serious threats 
from China, but also gave rise to US criticism that Taiwan was altering status quo. 
How could one assess this change of air? 
 
Indeed, the tension reduction does not even out military or economic imbalances 
across the strait, nor does it automatically increase Taiwan‟s international 
representation or recognition. However, it has undoubtedly silenced both Chinese 
threats and US criticism – at least in the short term. Does this imply that Taiwan – by 
changing US and Chinese incentives through its domestic policies – is creating 
elbowroom for itself by subtly maneuvering between the two giants? Or are Taiwan‟s 
policies rather a matter of necessity, and thus rather an illustration of marginal – or 
                                              
9
 Finlandization refers to the influence that a powerful country might have on the policies of a smaller 
neighboring country. The term dates back to the Soviet Union‟s influence on Finland‟s policies during the Cold 
War. 
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even shrinking – elbowroom? In short, what sources of leverage are available to 
Taiwan and to what extent are they capable of changing the gloomy picture painted 
above? 
 
1.4 Wrap-up: originality claim and thesis outline 
 
Indeed, this is not the first time that Taiwan‟s ability to shape its own future is being 
addressed, and obviously, using the term elbowroom does not in itself bring originality 
to a well researched field of study. There are, however, other factors providing 
leverage to the originality claim of this thesis. As the chapter on theory will stress in 
more detail, this is (to the author‟s knowledge) the first analysis to apply a smart 
power framework. In this way, it adds to an underdeveloped body of smart power 
literature – as called for by Nye (2007: 172) and popularized by Ms. Clinton. In the 
next instance, such a framework hopes to provide some new and valuable perspectives 
on what this thesis has labeled Taiwan‟s elbowroom. Adding empirical relevance to 
this latter claim is the recent shift in Taiwan‟s policies, along with current 
developments in China and Sino-US relations – both factors emphasized above. 
Finally, Taiwan‟s position as somewhat squeezed between two great powers arguably 
makes the analysis relevant on a more general level as well – that is, as a case study of 
small actors‟ ability to influence great power politics. 
 
Following this introduction, chapter two discusses the thesis‟ theoretical framework, as 
well as the research methods applied. Drawing on these two introductory chapters, the 
three next ones investigate how Taiwan‟s hard and soft power interplay (smart power) 
in the military, economic and political realm, respectively.
10
 Finally, chapter six 
examines how the combination of Taiwan‟s (smart) military, economic and political 
power defines the total scope of its elbowroom. The final chapter also attends briefly 
to theoretical implications and gives some suggestions for further research. 
                                              
10
 Obviously, the three realms overlap to some extent. Still, they are analyzed separately first, for the sake of 
structural clarity. 
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2 Theoretical Framework and Research Methods 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 3) describe IR as “a state-centric discipline as well as a 
power-centered discipline”, and this thesis does not intend to challenge any of those 
two foundations. On the contrary, the previous chapter did not only stress that what is 
under investigation is Taiwan‟s elbowroom as a de facto state. In addition, it pointed 
out that this elbowroom will be examined as a function of Taiwan‟s hard and soft 
power – that is, its smart power. Berenskoetter (2007: 2) notes that “IR scholars cannot 
ignore theoretical debates when thinking about „power‟”, while Treverton and Jones 
(2005: ix) hold that “at the dawn of the 21st century, the concept of power is more 
important than ever and also more debated”. The following goes into some detail about 
the theoretical framework of this thesis, which in essence revolves around the question 
of how to assess the power of states, with main emphasis on small states, and – 
obviously – Taiwan in particular. 
 
2.1.1 Small states and the concept of power 
 
Fox (1959: 4) asks the fundamental question “how can the small state exercise power 
in international politics?”, and she points out that “what is impressive is the variety of 
circumstances under which the power of a small state, when confronted with an 
unwelcome great-power demand, turns out to be much greater than any inventory of its 
internal resources would suggest” (Ibid: 8). This is what Lindell and Persson (1986) 
call the „paradox of weak state power‟, and many observers have brought attention to 
the issue. Some have approached it by studying alignment policies (Holst 1983; 
Rothstein 1968; and Vital 1971), others have looked at international negotiations 
(Habeeb 1988) or political integration projects like the EU (Griffiths & Pharo 1995; 
and Thorhallsson 2000). Some have also emphasized the development of world 
institutions as a channel of influence for small states (Mathisen 1971), and finally, 
14 
 
there are those who have pointed out that the end of the Cold War opened up more 
room of maneuver for small states through increased focus on norms and ideas (Lange 
et al. (Eds) 2009; and Neumann & Gstöhl 2006: 14-15). 
 
For the purpose here, the essence to draw from these contributions is their common 
emphasis on the strong link between the extent of small states‟ power on the one hand, 
and how power is being conceived or defined on the other (Handel 1990: 257-259; 
Neumann & Gstöhl 2006: 17-19; and Rothstein 1968: 2). Hence, this thesis proceeds 
through such a „power lens‟, and different conceptions of power make up the backbone 
of the following discussion. 
 
Power is a contested concept, as illustrated by Berenskoetter‟s (2007: 1-21) detailed 
account of how the power debate has developed throughout history. Steven Lukes‟ 
(2005) three dimensions of power create a good backdrop for this debate.
11
 The first 
dimension sees power as decision making and focuses mainly on „who wins‟, which 
typically emphasizes relative military capabilities. The second dimension brings „non-
decisions‟ or „agenda-setting power‟ into the equation by asking why (and how) some 
alternatives are left out of the debate. Finally, the third dimension stresses that power is 
at play in consensus as well as conflict, by emphasizing how preferences can be 
shaped by values and norms. 
 
Against this backdrop, one can raise several fundamental questions about the nature of 
power. These include whether power should be seen in absolute or relational terms; as 
a possession or an effect; as dominative or not (power over vs. power to); and whether 
or not power is at all measurable (Berenskoetter 2007; Habeeb 1988; and Schmidt 
2007). As will be apparent throughout this thesis, such questions are useful references 
that help structure the arguments, and one should therefore keep them in the back of 
one‟s mind as the focus is now directed towards the distinction (and interplay) between 
hard and soft power. 
                                              
11
 Berenskoetter (2007: 4-12) loosely associates these three dimensions with the three IR schools realism, 
institutionalism and constructivism, respectively. 
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2.1.2 Hard power and political realism  
 
There is a strong and long-lasting connection between power and political realism. 
Illustratively, Mearsheimer (2001: 12) states that for all realists, “calculations of power 
lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them”. And although 
Schmidt (2007) importantly points out that realists do not make up a unified and 
coherent group who share an identical conception of power, most people will probably 
agree with Berenskoetter (2007: 6) that in general, “the realist baseline takes the 
distribution of military capabilities as the indicator for measuring „power‟”. 
Mearsheimer‟s (2001) definition of power serves as a good example.12 
 
Mearsheimer (2001: 55) defines power as a combination of military and latent power, 
where the former consists of a state‟s army and its supporting air and naval forces, 
while the latter is made up of economic and demographic resources capable of 
translating into (more) military force. In other words, power consists of capabilities – 
as opposed to both outcomes (Ibid: 57-60) and intentions (Ibid: 45) – and these 
capabilities can be categorized into weapons, money (to buy more weapons), and 
people (soldiers). This is hard power. Given this emphasis on material (measurable) 
capabilities, Mearsheimer (2001: 12) holds that “with good indicators (…), it is 
possible to determine the power levels of individual states (…)”. Furthermore, since 
hard power is what matters, states that wish to increase their power rely in all essence 
on military means – that is, war, blackmail (threat of force), bait and bleed (weakening 
rivals by provoking a fight between them) and bloodletting (making a rival‟s war 
protracted and deadly) (Ibid: 138-139).
13
 
 
In short, then, Mearsheimer‟s power is a hard and measurable possession. Moreover, 
                                              
12
 It is worth noting here that Waltz (1979: 131) famously holds that a state‟s capabilities rest on a combination 
of the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political 
stability and competence. Mearsheimer (2001) is chosen here mainly because of the accessibility – that is, the 
straightforwardness – of his arguments. 
13
 To be fair, Mearsheimer (2001: 34) also includes other factors than strict military ones in his analysis, like for 
instance diplomacy. 
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and somewhat confusingly, while power is seen in relative – as opposed to absolute – 
terms, it is also seen in absolute – as opposed to relational – terms. That is, while 
Mearsheimer (Ibid: 34) explicitly underlines that what matters to a country is its power 
relative to other countries (power over), he also adheres to what Guzzini (2000: 55) 
calls a “lump concept” of power, where power is seen as a collection of accumulated 
elements making up a fungible general indicator (See also Berenskoetter 2007: 3; and 
Schmidt 2007: 47-48).
14
 
 
Such a conception of power leaves small actors quite powerless, and political realists 
do indeed have a long history of ascribing small states with limited influence over 
great power politics. Illustratively, more than 2000 years ago Thucydides famously 
stated that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Strassler 
(Ed) 1998: 352), while more recent examples include Morgenthau‟s (1948: 196) claim 
that “small nations have always owed their independence either to the balance of 
power (…), or to the preponderance of one protecting power (…), or to their lack of 
attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations”. 
 
2.1.3 Soft power – a weapon of the weak 
 
On the most general level, Nye (2004: 2) holds that “power is the ability to influence 
the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants”, and he puts forward three basic 
mechanisms through which such an ability might play out – that is coercion (sticks), 
inducement (carrots) and attraction (co-option) (Ibid: 5). While the two former are 
grounded essentially in military and economic resources (hard power), attraction rests 
mainly on intangible assets and is described as the “ability to shape the preference of 
others” to make them “want the outcomes you want” (Ibid). This „attractive power‟ is 
what Nye has labeled soft power, and a country has three main sources of it – those 
being “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it 
                                              
14
 Naturally, this „lump concept‟ makes the process of measuring/assessing power quite straightforward. The 
problem, however, is that such an assessment/measurement does not consider context and outcome, as stressed 
below. 
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lives up to them at home and abroad) and foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2004: 12).15 16 Finally, it is worth 
mentioning the idea of negative soft power – that is, the opposite of attraction, which 
is often labeled repulsion (Ibid: 12-13, 29). The notion of repulsion is useful to keep in 
mind for the discussion on how hard and soft power interplay. 
 
A concrete example might help illustrate and sum up the main difference between the 
power categories introduced above. If you refuse to jump up and down like a chicken, 
but then you change your mind when I put a gun against your head, I have coerced you 
with a tangible military resource. Furthermore, if you yield because I offer you a sum 
of money, you have been induced by tangible economic resources. However, if I 
appeal to your love and compassion for caged fowls and convince you that you might 
contribute to releasing them by doing what I tell you to, I am trying to attract you by 
applying an intangible resource. Importantly, Nye (2007: 169) would hold that 
although your „degrees of freedom‟ indeed vary significantly in these three cases, 
power is nonetheless at play in all of them. 
 
The above shows that soft power might differ from hard power in terms of both 
resources (tangible vs. intangible) and mechanism (coercion and inducement vs. 
attraction). However, it is important to stress that Nye‟s conception of power diverges 
from Mearsheimer‟s in a more fundamental way as well. By defining power as 
something that exists in a relationship, Nye rejects a „lump concept‟ consisting of 
measurable capabilities. Following Baldwin (1979), who emphasizes that whether or 
not power resources produce power behavior depends on the context, Nye (2004: 3) 
holds that “power resources are not as fungible as money”, but “always depend on the 
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 Nye also claims that the importance of soft power is currently increasing. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, he holds that in the „global information age‟, the question is not only “who‟s military or economy wins, but 
also who‟s story wins” (Nye 2004: 30-32). Second, he argues that the role of military power is changing as the 
political and social costs of using military force are raised (Ibid: 18-21).Obviously, however, not everybody 
agrees with Nye in this claim. For example, Edward Luttwak (Telegraph, August 16, 2008) claims that Russia‟s 
invasion in Georgia in 2008 proved once and for all that soft power is irrelevant.  
16
 It might be useful to stress that although soft power is a quite recent term, the concept itself is certainly not 
new – as is the case for hard power as well. For example, ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius is often credited 
with early versions of soft power (Nye 2007: 162). 
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context in which the relationship exists” (Ibid: 2).17 Hence, although Nye‟s definition 
of power (as quoted above) labels power as an ability – that is, a sort of possession – it 
also stresses the outcome (effect), and thus shifts some emphasis from power over 
towards power to (See also Berenskoetter 2007: 6-7; Mearsheimer 2001: 57-60; 
Ringmar 2007; and Schmidt 2007: 47-48). 
 
In this regard, Nye (2007: 164) warns observers about committing the so-called 
„vehicle fallacy‟ of “confus[ing] the resources that may produce behavior with the 
behavior itself”. In other words, pointing out that a country did not achieve its goal is 
not the same as proving that it did not have power, since “favorable outcomes [also] 
depend on context and the skills of the agent” (Ibid).18 Similarly, though, one also 
needs to watch out for the tautology trap. That is, it might be tempting to argue that a 
country has power simply by pointing out that it succeeded.
19
 
 
Importantly, the fact that Nye‟s conception of power differs significantly from that of 
most realists does not mean that soft power is necessarily in conflict with realism as 
such. On the contrary, Nye (2007: 170) actually underlines that “there is no 
contradiction between realism and soft power. Soft power is not a form of idealism or 
liberalism. It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes”. In 
other words, soft power – like Mearsheimer‟s hard power above – should be seen as a 
descriptive rather than a normative concept. 
 
The main point to draw from this is that soft power arguably opens up more channels 
of influence to small states than does a strict focus on hard power. Accordingly, 
Goldstein (2008: 26-27) holds that “some actors have international influence that 
exceeds their economic and military power, [which] suggests that soft power can 
actually compensate for deficiencies in other categories of power”. In the words of 
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 Attraction, for example, will obviously always depend on “who is doing the perceiving” (Treverton & Jones 
2005: 10). 
18
 Importantly Nye (2007: 164) stresses that such context-sensitivity is not unique to soft power, since “having a 
larger tank is of little help if the battle is fought in a swamp”.  
19
 Naturally, these problems are not as prevalent if one adheres to a „lump concept‟ of power. 
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Treverton and Jones (2005: 14), “soft power enhances the room for the weak to 
maneuver, giving them more opportunity to resist coercion”.20 
 
2.1.4 Interplay between hard and soft – smart power 
 
The dividing line between hard and soft power is not always clear-cut. For one thing, 
tangible power resources – like weapons and money – might sometimes work through 
attraction as well as coercion or inducement, and might thus contribute to producing 
soft power, as subsequent chapters will illustrate. Furthermore, Smith (2007) points 
out that persuasion – especially when coming from a powerful country – easily shades 
over into coercion. Along the same lines, Mattern (2007) points out how attraction is 
an ambiguous term, since it remains somewhat unclear whether it should be seen as 
something „natural‟, or rather as „socially constructed‟. Mattern (Ibid) labels the latter 
„representational force‟, and claims that it is basically coercive or inductive in nature 
even if it rests on an intangible resource. 
 
Illustrating this point even further, Lukes (2007) points out that while Nye takes an 
agent-based approach, one could instead focus on the subject, and ask under what 
circumstances it is susceptible to attraction. That is, one might want to ask whether the 
agent actively and consciously uses soft power as a tool to get a desirable outcome 
(representational force), or whether it is rather the subject who is attracted to the agent 
on its own accord. If I am attracted to you – or perhaps even in love with you – I might 
arguably be more inclined to support you. However, if you know about my feelings, 
and then use this knowledge intentionally to seduce me into supporting you – should 
we then call this attraction, inducement or coercion? In short, it is often extremely 
difficult to decide to what extent the subject‟s choice of policies is a result of the 
agent‟s soft power (attraction), and to what extent it is simply a result of an overall 
assessment of pros and cons, where attraction might play only a marginal part. 
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 Importantly, this is not to say that soft power is exclusively (or even mainly) relevant for small states. Indeed, 
the term was introduced in association with US power (Nye 1990), and recently, China‟s soft power has become 
a popular area of study (Kurlantzick 2007; and Li 2009). 
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Although the distinction between hard and soft power is sometimes blurry, the essence 
is that they “interplay and sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with [or 
undercut] each other” (Nye 2004: 25; see also Nye 2007: 169). In line with the above, 
such interplay is highly context-sensitive, and hence, some of the theoretical 
discussion is left for the chapters on military, economic and political power, 
respectively. For now, it suffices to state stat smart power is arguably at play when 
hard and soft power go hand in hand and work in the same direction – that is, when 
they reinforce each other instead of undercutting each other.
21
 
 
Smart power has been targeted in some research. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) conducted a report on US smart power in 2007, which concludes that 
the US can “become a smarter power (…) by complementing U.S. military and 
economic might with greater investments in soft power” (CSIS report 2007). Also, 
Hoadley (2006) uses the term to analyze New Zealand‟s security situation, and 
Mahbubani (2008) applies it on China‟s strategy to emerge as a great power. However, 
as was carefully stressed in the introduction, the concept remains under-researched and 
ambiguous, leading to Nye‟s call for illustrative cases. The following section explains 
why Taiwan under President Ma constitutes such a case. 
 
2.1.5 Taiwan as a case 
 
First and most basically, both hard and soft elements are highly „visible‟ in Taiwan‟s 
case. While the former is represented quite clearly by China‟s ever-present military 
threats, the latter is signified by the fact that several scholars put strong emphasis on 
Taiwan‟s soft power as a means of compensating for a relative lack of hard power 
(Goldstein 2008; Lee 2007; Lu 2007; and Tsang 2008). In Tsang‟s (2008: 10) words, 
“soft power is of greater importance to Taiwan than to any other country”. 
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 Keep in mind that smart power was defined in the introduction as “the ability to combine hard and soft power 
into a winning strategy” (Nye/The Boston Globe, August 19, 2006). Also, as was the case with regard to both 
hard and soft power above, smart power is not a new concept although the term is quite new. Ancient Chinese 
philosopher and military strategist Sun Tzu is often mentioned in this regard (Chan 2005). 
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Second, Taiwan‟s history – and the before-mentioned presidency of Chen Shui-bian 
from 2000 to 2008 in particular – has demonstrated quite clearly the limitations of both 
hard and soft power. In terms of the former, Chen (China Brief, November 19, 2009) 
lays out the historical process through which Taiwan has eventually given up a long-
lasting policy of matching China militarily. Regarding soft power limitations, it is 
illustrative that President Chen actively played the „soft power card‟ in his attempts to 
gain de jure independence (Larus 2006, 2008; Lin 2008; and Tsang 2008). Not only 
did this mission fail to achieve its goal. Arguably, it even worked counterproductively, 
exemplified by severely deteriorating relations to both China and the US, as well as 
the loss of six diplomatic allies. 
 
In short, both hard and soft power is very much present, while both have also proved 
their shortcomings. Hence, when assessing Taiwan‟s elbowroom under President Ma, 
it makes sense to examine the leverage that might result from the interplay between the 
two. That is, it makes sense to apply a smart power framework, and as an interesting 
curiosity, President Ma has in fact labeled his national security strategy „SMART‟ (Ma 
2008).
22
 
 
To sum up, it is useful to emphasize once again that this thesis serves two parallel 
purposes. For one thing, it aspires to be a theoretical contribution to refining the 
concept of smart power. To be sure, this does not involve trying to prove Mearsheimer 
or Nye wrong, but merely to use – and transcend – their concepts in an attempt to 
supplement the power debate. Second, in terms of empiricism, a smart power approach 
might offer some useful insights on Taiwan – and perhaps on small actors in general. 
Importantly, this is not the same as assessing „what is smart for Taiwan‟, since such 
direct policy recommendations are beyond the scope of this thesis. That is, smart 
power should be understood descriptively, as was stressed with regard to both hard and 
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 SMART is an acronym for „soft power‟, „military deterrence‟, „assuring status quo‟, „restoring mutual trust‟ 
and „Taiwan‟. It was presented by President Ma in a speech before the Association for the Promotion of National 
Security on February 26, 2008. 
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soft power above. 
 
The following section explains briefly how the tasks presented above will be carried 
out – that is, the research methods applied. 
  
2.2 Research methods 
 
Yin (1994: 4-6) distinguishes between exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case 
studies, and this thesis arguably contains elements of all three categories. Given the 
status of smart power as an underdeveloped concept, the thesis is exploratory in the 
sense that it collects information and looks for patterns that might contribute to 
refining the concept. (What is smart power?) On the other hand, both hard and soft 
power are well established terms that give clear direction to the research, thus adding a 
descriptive component. (What does Taiwan‟s hard and soft power consist in and how 
do they interplay?) Finally, although this thesis does not investigate a process through 
which causal factors lead to a specific outcome, it is nonetheless explanatory in the 
sense that it aspires to add explanation to the issue of Taiwan‟s relatively large amount 
of leverage vis-à-vis China and the US. (How is Taiwan able to maintain or create 
elbowroom despite its relative weakness?) 
 
Furthermore, since the concepts of „smart power‟ and „elbowroom‟ are both very 
vague, some would probably comment that applying them involves serious challenges 
in terms of operationalization and measurement (Adcock & Collier 2001; and 
Treverton and Jones 2005).
23
 However, this thesis does not attempt to determine the 
precise amount of Taiwan‟s smart power or the exact size of its elbowroom. Rather, it 
seeks to identify areas where smart power is a useful term, and in the next instance 
suggest how it contributes to defining what has been labeled Taiwan‟s elbowroom. In 
other words, while this thesis does not present a complete operationalization that 
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 Adcock and Collier (2001) discuss operationalization as a methodological tool, while Treverton and Jones 
(2005) address the challenges associated with measuring power – both hard and soft. 
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allows for strict measurement, it provides a thorough theoretical discussion that creates 
a sufficient foundation for carrying out the analysis. 
 
What sources are required in order to carry out the tasks outlined above? Most 
basically, existing academic literature makes up an important component. Furthermore, 
newspaper articles – both opinion- and news-pieces – serve to supplement scholarly 
publications, especially when dealing with contemporary events that are not yet to be 
found in published research. Besides, some primary sources like government 
documents or political speeches are included when found necessary. Finally (and 
importantly), this thesis also draws on twelve semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
Taiwanese informants and respondents, conducted in Taipei from May 10
th
 to 21
st
 
2010.
24
 
25
 These interviews were essential for two main reasons. First, discussing the 
issues in question with relevant people and institutions in Taiwan obviously adds an 
invaluable perspective to the analysis. Second, the lack of smart power literature, as 
well as the fact that this thesis deals with recent and contemporary issues, makes direct 
interviews an important source of information. 
 
Interviewees were chosen on basis of what kind of information they were likely to 
provide – that is, what Bryman (2004: 334) calls „purposive sampling‟. Furthermore, 
since smart power is a somewhat all-embracing term, such a selection includes 
scholars, policy makers, military officers, think tanks and NGOs – of which policy 
makers and military officers chose to be anonymous due to the sensitivity of some 
issues. The author kept a flexible interview guide – aspiring to avoid asking leading 
questions – and took written notes during the interviews.26 
 
Against the methodological backdrop created above, the concept of validity is 
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 In the following, „interviewee‟ will refer to both informants and respondents (Jacobsen 2005: 171).  
25
 Obviously, it would have been very useful to include interviewees in „target countries‟ as well – that is China 
and the US – but naturally, lack of time and resources made this impossible. 
26
 Although some basic questions were the same for all interviewees, they were naturally asked questions 
according to their specific field of expertise as well. It should also be mentioned that since Taiwan is a highly 
divided society politically, one needs to be attentive of interviewees having a political agenda. Interview notes 
are available on request. 
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somewhat difficult to pinpoint, mainly because of the reservations made in terms of 
causality, operationalization and measurement. In short, however, construct- and 
internal validity should be understood as the extent to which the smart power 
framework is perceived as valuable in terms of analyzing the empirical case – that is, 
Taiwan‟s elbowroom. This requires the author to be highly attentive of staying focused 
on the theoretical framework throughout the thesis, and accordingly, each empirical 
chapter starts with a theoretical section. Also, the use of multiple sources – as outlined 
above – helps ensure internal validity (source triangulation). Regarding external 
validity, it is sufficient for now to stress that this thesis is certainly not trying to 
develop a coherent theory of smart power, and hence, one should not automatically 
take the findings to be generalizable. This will be addressed in some more detail in the 
final chapter when discussing theoretical implications. 
 
Finally, the concept of reliability is also a bit ambiguous in this context, since a 
qualitative analysis like this one will unavoidably rest to some extent on the author‟s 
own interpretations of the sources. However, being explicit about sources and research 
methods – as this thesis aspires to be – will at least allow others to access the same 
information as the author has, in which case a different conclusion would only give 
rise to interesting debates. 
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3 Taiwan’s Military Power 
 
This chapter seeks to assess Taiwan‟s military power as it appears in interplay between 
hard and soft aspects – that is, its smart military power. The first section is a theoretical 
discussion about the relationship between military resources and power. Following suit 
is an outline of the cross-strait military imbalance in hard power terms. Third, soft 
aspects are included as Taiwan‟s smart military power vis-à-vis China and the US is 
assessed. 
 
3.1 The nature of military power  
 
One might easily assume that military power means hard power, and indeed, this is 
true to a large extent – after all, it is hard to deny the fact that a gun is rather coercive 
in nature. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it seems at first glance. As 
Nye (2007: 167) points out, “military power appears to be a defining resource for hard 
power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft power”. In other words, 
although military power always involves a considerable hard power component, it 
does not necessarily consist exclusively of hard power. 
 
In order to grasp this somewhat confusing distinction, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that chapter two defined soft power as the ability to shape the preference of others – 
through attraction rather than coercion or inducement – to make them want the 
outcome you want. Illustrative in this regard is Osama bin Laden‟s famous quote that 
“when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong 
horse” (See for example Walt/Foreign Policy, April 22, 2010). Along the same lines, 
Nye (2007: 167) points to the 1991 Desert Storm campaign as well as the US armed 
forces‟ relief efforts in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami as examples of how military 
resources can be perceived as attractive, and thus projecting soft power.
27
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 Obviously, these two examples are intrinsically different – the former being potentially attractive because of its 
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Just as military resources can project soft power, they “can also undercut soft power” 
(Nye 2007: 168, author‟s italics). Nye (Taipei Times, September 4, 2008) mentions the 
Soviet Union‟s violent campaigns in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as examples in this 
regard, but an equally illustrative – and more relevant – example is arguably the 1989 
Tiananmen massacre in Beijing. As will be discussed in more detail below, the point is 
that when the use of military force is seen as illegitimate, it runs the risk of seriously 
undercutting soft power, which in the next instance might have strong implications for 
one‟s total scope of military power.28 
 
As discussed in chapter two, it is not always easy to draw a clear line between 
coercion, inducement and attraction. However, the essence is that “military resources 
can produce [and undercut] soft as well as hard power, depending on the context in 
which they are used” (Nye 2007: 168). This leads to an important notion for anyone 
carrying out the task of assessing power distributions. Even when such an assessment 
is limited to military power – like in this chapter – it is not sufficient to count guns, 
soldiers and money, although this is certainly a key component that will be addressed 
in the following section. One needs to take soft aspects into consideration as well. That 
is, one needs to look at how hard and soft military power interplay, and whether such 
interplay might constitute smart military power.
29
 
 
3.2 A large and growing hard power imbalance across the strait 
 
Denmark and Fontaine (2009: 3-4) state that “fifteen years ago, Taiwan enjoyed a 
formidable qualitative military advantage over the mainland. This advantage has 
                                                                                                                                             
convincing strength, while the latter‟s attractiveness is grounded in its good intentions. Besides, it is useful here 
to remind about the fact that attraction is always dependent on who is doing the perceiving, as was stressed in 
chapter two. For example, one can easily imagine that not all Iraqis were equally attracted by the Desert Storm 
campaign. 
28
 This is relevant to what was mentioned in chapter two about repulsion as the opposite of attraction. 
29
 As mentioned in chapter two, scholars who downplay the relevance of soft power obviously do not claim that 
a hard power assessment of relative military capabilities is sufficient in terms of predicting an outcome 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 34). 
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eroded.” A Taiwanese senior naval officer (retired) gave a similar assessment in 
conversation with the author, noting that “ten years ago, we could fight, but today – no” 
(Interview, May 13, 2010). Moreover, these are certainly not the only observers to 
stress that the military balance across the strait has changed greatly in Taiwan‟s 
disfavor over the last couple of decades as a result of China‟s rapid economic growth 
and considerable military build-up (Chase 2008a; Cole 2006; Swaine et al. (Eds) 2007; 
and Tsang 2006 (Ed)). The following goes into some detail about this hard power 
imbalance. 
 
First, Shlapak et al. (2009, Summary: xv) hold that China‟s Short Range Ballistic 
Missiles (SRBM) are able to “knock the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) out of 
the war for long enough to launch large-scale air raids on Taiwan, [and in the next 
instance] suppress ROCAF operations indefinitely and lay Taiwan open to further 
Chinese air attacks”.30 Adding leverage to such gloomy predictions about the SRBMs, 
a report released by Taiwan‟s Ministry of National Defense (MND) in July this year 
estimates that the number of SRBMs aimed at Taiwan will reach approximately 2000 
by the end of 2010 (See for example Taipei Times, July 19, 2010).
31
 
 
Second, Shlapak et.al. (2009, Summary: xvi) also claim that “China‟s ability to 
suppress or close the ROCAF‟s bases could give the People‟s Liberation Army Air 
Force (PLAAF) an almost overwhelming numerical advantage that (…) could allow 
China to attain air superiority over Taiwan and the strait”. Finally, Holmes and 
Yoshihara (2010) state that “the ROCN‟s [Republic of China Navy] prospects for 
wresting sea control from the PLAN [People‟s Liberation Army Navy] in wartime 
appear slight [and] worsening by the day”. In short, Taiwan is not only facing a fast 
growing threat from Chinese SRBMs, but also seems to be losing both air and sea 
control to China. 
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 Shlapak et.al. (2009) is a follow-on effort to Shlapak et.al. (2000), and hence, comparing the two illustrates 
well how the balance has changed considerably over the last decade.  
31
 Only four months before this report was released, Taiwan Today (March 18) referred to an estimated the total 
of 1400 missiles, suggesting a massive increase over a quite short time. Importantly, though, these are all 
speculations, and Bush (The Washington Times, September 8, 2010) actually holds that China‟s missile build-up 
has taken a „pause‟. 
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It is necessary here to add a few words about what Mearsheimer (2001: 83, 114-128) 
calls the “stopping power of water”. In essence, this concept describes how large 
bodies of water (the Taiwan Strait) significantly limit a country‟s (China) power-
projection capabilities. Hence, despite the large (and growing) military imbalance 
outlined above, the outcome of a Chinese attempt on a full scale invasion of Taiwan 
remains uncertain. Illustratively, Shlapak et.al. (2009, Summary: xvi) call such a task 
“dauntingly difficult”, Tsang (2006: 7) uses even stronger words like “foolhardy” and 
“suicide”, while the abovementioned senior naval officer noted dryly that “Taiwan is 
lucky to have the strait” (Interview, May 13, 2010). 
 
A question that follows naturally from this is for how long Taiwan would be able to 
hold off a Chinese attack. A Taiwanese colonel and senior defense researcher told the 
author that until some years ago, it was commonly believed that Taiwan could hold 
China for at least two weeks, but that today, many have started to doubt whether this is 
possible (Interview, May 15, 2010). In line with this pessimistic view, a computerized 
war game recently carried out by Taiwan‟s military concluded that China could in fact 
seize Taipei in only three days (See for example The China Post, August 5, 2010).
32
 
Obviously, no one can know for certain how a cross-strait military confrontation 
would play out in real life, but still, the picture painted here is certainly not uplifting 
for Taiwan.
33
 
 
In sum, although the Taiwan Strait – as well as the ambiguous US security guarantee – 
offers what seems to be strongly needed protection, there is little doubt that a large and 
growing imbalance exists across the strait in terms of hard military power. It is against 
this backdrop that the chapter now turns to assess Taiwan‟s smart military power with 
regard to responding to this imbalance. 
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 This conclusion was dismissed by the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND). 
33
 Naturally, any assessment of the cross-strait military balance is incomplete without taking the „US factor‟ into 
consideration, as touched upon in the introduction. This issue is be dealt with below.  
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3.3 Taiwan‟s smart military power 
 
How does hard and soft military power interplay in Taiwan‟s case? How might the 
interplay constitute smart military power? And finally, how and to what extent does it 
contribute to adjust the military imbalance outlined above? The following sections 
attempts to answer these questions by looking at Taiwan‟s smart military power vis-à-
vis China and the US, respectively. 
 
3.3.1 Taiwan’s smart military power vis-à-vis China: a legitimate defense 
 
A useful starting point here is how the so-called „security dilemma‟ holds that “the 
measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of 
other states” (Mearsheimer 2001: 36). From the above, it is quite clear that China‟s 
military strength (and threat) poses a threat to Taiwan‟s security.34 Hence, Taiwan faces 
obvious incentives to increase its security by strengthening its military capabilities.
35
 
However, the security dilemma tells us that this would easily run the risk of provoking 
China, which is certainly not in Taiwan‟s interest, given China‟s relative military 
strength. It appears, then, that Taiwan is stuck in a deadlock where responding to the 
security threats from China is crucial on the one hand, but extremely risky on the other. 
Might soft power play a part here? 
 
For obvious reasons, it is somewhat difficult to imagine Taiwan‟s military being 
perceived as particularly attractive by China. However, the director for foreign policy 
studies at Taiwan Think Tank (TTT) Dr. Lai I-Chung analyzed Taiwan‟s military 
situation by stating that Taiwan obviously needs a strong and credible defense, and that 
it has to avoid the trap that it cannot anger China, while at the same time not give the 
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 Not only is Taiwan‟s relative weakness worrying in terms of chances of success in a military confrontation. In 
addition, former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan Nat Bellocchi (Taipei Times, July 4, 2010) claims 
that “[relative] reductions in (…) defense capability invite aggression”, which suggests that China‟s inclination 
to aggression against Taiwan increases along with the cross-strait military imbalance. 
35
 Several observers have also pointed out how strengthening Taiwan‟s military is important in terms of 
negotiating from a position of strength in future political talks (Chase/China Brief, July 17, 2008c). 
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impression that it is provoking (Interview, May 13, 2010).
36
 Along the same lines, and 
perhaps more „to the point‟, Ambassador Charles Teng at National Policy Foundation 
(NPF) stated that Taiwan obviously needs arms, but that it needs to arm smartly, since 
it does not want an arms race (Interview, May 19, 2010).
37
 
 
Simply put, Taiwan‟s challenge is to respond to its difficult security situation in a 
militarily effective, but non-provoking way. While the security dilemma tells us that 
this idea of arming without provoking is something of a contradiction, Booth and 
Wheeler (2008) introduce the term „security dilemma sensitivity‟, which might serve 
to adjust such a view. The term is defined in the following way: 
 
Security dilemma sensibility is an actor‟s intention and capacity to perceive the motives 
behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military 
intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might 
play in their attitudes and behavior, including, crucially, the role that one‟s own actions may 
play in provoking that fear (Booth & Wheeler 2008: 7). 
 
In other words, one might possibly overcome the security dilemma by seeing beyond 
the weapons themselves and look instead at how they are being perceived, and the 
intentions behind them. In Taiwan‟s case, the distinction between offensive and 
defensive capabilities is illustrative. 
 
There is a complex and long-lasting debate in Taiwan about whether or not to acquire 
offensive military capabilities (Chase/China Brief, July 27, 2007; Cole 2006: 163-164; 
Murray 2008; and Tsai/China Brief, April 16, 2009). The essence of this debate is quite 
visible in Murray‟s (2008: 15-16) argument that a „porcupine‟ defensive strategy 
“would offer Taiwan a way to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months, [and] 
might also be less provocative to the PRC (…)”.38 This thesis does not intend to make 
a judgment about whether such a porcupine strategy is a good choice for Taiwan or 
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 TTT is an unaffiliated think tank, but is openly supporting the DPP. 
37
 NPF is a KMT-affiliated think tank. 
38
 In brief, Murray argues strongly in favor of defensive asymmetric capabilities. (The reader should keep in 
mind the „stopping power of water‟.) 
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not.
39
 Still, the above implies that the relationship between the effectiveness of 
Taiwan‟s defense on the one hand, and the extent to which it sends a provocative 
message to China on the other, is not necessarily proportional. Put differently, although 
military strength from Taiwan‟s side is not likely to appear directly attractive to China, 
it is certainly conceivable that some military postures are perceived as more attractive 
than others. In the words of Dr. Lu Yeh-Chung at National Chengchi University 
(NCCU), “[Taiwan‟s] hard power can enhance [its] soft power, depending on how it is 
being used (Interview, May 17, 2010).
40
 Does this suggest that Taiwan‟s military 
power might project soft power vis-à-vis China? 
 
Relevant to this question is the before-mentioned notion of military power not only 
being capable of projecting soft power, but also of undercutting it – exemplified above 
by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In essence, the large and growing military threat 
from China – symbolized most clearly by the rapid increase in SRBMs – represents a 
quite sharp contrast to Taiwan‟s relative weakness. Hence, China arguably runs a high 
risk of being depicted as a brutal (and authoritarian) aggressor against a defenseless 
(and democratic) Taiwan (Tsang 2006: 1-14). Tunsjø (2008: 88-91) highlights this 
point through the term „binary opposites‟, and chapter five will deal with this issue in 
more detail. 
 
For the purpose here, the key point is that China‟s military threat against Taiwan – not 
to mention an actual use of force – is a „difficult sell‟ in terms of legitimacy.41 As the 
abovementioned senior naval officer put it, “if you [China] want to win a woman 
[Taiwan], you take her out for dinner and buy her gifts – you don‟t point a gun [SRBM] 
at her head” (Interview, May 13, 2010). Furthermore, if legitimacy is an important 
precondition for the actual use of force, then lack of legitimacy is somewhat 
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 Proponents of offensive capabilities argue that the only credible Taiwanese deterrent would be the ability to 
strike back. Dr. Lai at TTT argued along such lines (Interview, May 13, 2010). Furthermore, in line with the 
security dilemma, Mearsheimer (2001: 30-31) argues that even a population‟s hands and feet possess some 
offensive capabilities, and naturally, so do all weapons. In this view, the idea of defensive weapons does not 
make much logic sense.  
40
 NCCU is Taiwan‟s leading university within political science. 
41
 Importantly, this might refer to domestic legitimacy as well as legitimacy abroad (including Taiwan). 
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synonymous to lack of credibility, which in the final instance arguably contributes to 
reducing the overall military threat. Along these lines, a senior official from the Strait 
Exchange Foundation (SEF) described China‟s SRBMs as a “symbol of a threat rather 
than a real threat” (Interview, May 12, 2010).42 Although many will argue that this as 
an overstatement, the message is nonetheless quite clear. 
 
In illustrative contrast, Dr. Francis Kan at NCCU emphasized that Taiwan‟s defense is 
quite „sellable‟: “in Taiwan‟s case, there is no contradiction between military 
capabilities and soft power, since Taiwan has no choice – it is under threat, and hence 
it needs a strong defense” (Interview, May 17, 2010). This might suggest that while 
China‟s military strength (and threat) runs a high risk of undercutting its soft power 
(and hence the total scope of its military power), Taiwan‟s hard and soft military power 
go hand in hand. However, before making a final assessment about Taiwan‟s hard, soft 
and smart military power vis-à-vis China, its current defense policies – as well as 
China‟s response to them – need to be assessed against the backdrop created above. 
 
Regarding Taiwan‟s military posture, President Ma presented his „Hard ROC‟ 
defensive stance in a speech to the Association for the Promotion of National Security 
in February 2008 (Ma 2008).
43
 The president argued that such a defensive military 
posture would enable Taiwan to “arm and armor [itself] only to the point that the 
Mainland cannot be sure of being able to launch a „first strike‟ that would crush [its] 
defensive capacity” (Ibid). In the same speech, Ma largely rejected offensive military 
capabilities on grounds that they are “not only infeasible, but also dangerous”. And 
indeed, only a few months after taking power in 2008, the Ma administration 
announced that it would not develop offensive counterstrike missiles (Hsiao/China 
Brief, September 3, 2008).
44
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 SEF is a semi-governmental body that conducts direct official contact with China‟s equivalent body, the 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). (The reason why they are semi-governmental is 
because of the unresolved relationship between China and Taiwan.) 
43
 Hard ROC is a play on words that is meant to convey the idea of Republic of China (ROC) being solid as a 
ROCK(!) 
44
 There have in fact been (unconfirmed) speculations about whether such a program has been reopened 
(Hsiao/China Brief, April 1, 2010). 
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Furthermore, an increased emphasis on soft power and defensive capabilities seems to 
be visible in military circles as well. The senior naval officer told the author that 
“[Taiwanese] military leaders today are less willing to attack, they want to defend and 
protect, [and hence the] MND is increasingly taking soft power into consideration 
(Interview, May 13, 2010). Also, the colonel and senior defense researcher held that 
“the MND knows that we don‟t get anywhere only with hard power, we need to rely 
on soft power as well” (Interview, May 15, 2010). Finally, Taiwan‟s first ever 
published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), submitted by the MND in 2009, is 
highly illustrative in this regard. Although Chen (China Brief, November 19, 2009), 
Mei (China Brief, May 27, 2010) and Huang (Taipei Times, March 20, 2009) all point 
out that the QDR does not fully adopt the porcupine strategy suggested by Murray 
(2008), it is undoubtedly heavily influenced by it (Tsai/China Brief, April 16, 2009).
46
 
 
In terms of China‟s response to these policies, it is highly interesting to note China‟s 
reaction to the Obama administration‟s announcement in January this year of a $6.4 
billon arms sale to Taiwan (see below). In essence, several commentators pointed out 
how China‟s angry (and quite predictable) response was targeted almost exclusively at 
the US, and not at Taiwan (See for example Romberg/China Leadership Monitor, no. 
31, 2010a). In other words, China was much more upset with the US for selling than it 
was with Taiwan for buying, which suggests that even China – although obviously 
never particularly happy about Taiwan improving its military capabilities – still 
somewhat acknowledges Taiwan‟s need for a self defense.47 Relevant here is Chase 
(China Brief, July 17, 2008c) speaking about “Taiwan‟s legitimate defense needs” 
(author‟s italics). Since legitimacy is certainly a highly subjective term, and given the 
fact that China sees Taiwan‟s very existence as illegitimate, it is extremely interesting 
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 The „Hard ROC‟ posture stands in clear contrast to former president Chen Shui-bian‟s strategy of „Decisive 
Campaign outside the Territory‟, which involved an emphasis on counterstrike capabilities (Chen/China Brief, 
November 19, 2009). 
46
 Again, the contrast to the 2000 National Defense Report (NDR) – the first NDR under President Chen – is 
highly visible (Chen/China Brief, November 19, 2009). 
47
 There were certainly other reasons as well (economic and political) for China not to target Taiwan. These will 
be dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
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to note how Romberg (China Leadership Monitor, no. 29, 2009b: 11) claims that “even 
some PLA officers express understanding of [Taiwan‟s] need for a robust defense in 
the face of PLA modernization.” 
 
Taken together, the above suggests that strengthening Taiwan‟s defense capabilities 
(hard power) might simultaneously send a somewhat attractive (defensive) message to 
China (soft power), possibly contributing to shaping the attitude (preferences) of the 
latter. In other words, Taiwan‟s hard and soft military power arguably interplay and 
reinforce each other, constituting smart military power. This seems to give Taiwan 
more military leverage vis-à-vis China than the hard power imbalance suggests.  
 
3.3.2 Taiwan’s smart military power vis-à-vis the US: a credible defense 
 
To start with the basics, the TRA states that it is US policy to 
 
consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means; to provide 
Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to 
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan (TRA: Section 2; b; 4, 5, 6).
48
 
 
Furthermore, the 1982 „Six Assurances to Taiwan‟ promise among other issues that 
the US will “not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan” (Six Assurances: 
1), and that it “will not revise the TRA” (Six Assurances: 4). This might appear to be 
quite reassuring for Taiwan, especially since US involvement in a cross-strait military 
confrontation is obviously capable of tilting the hard military power balance 
considerably in Taiwan‟s favor – either through arms sales, actual military action, or 
threats of the latter. Still, however, there is no shortage of warnings that Taiwan‟s 
defense efforts do not match the security threat it is facing (Chase 2008a; Chase 2008b; 
Cole 2006; and Murray 2008), and what is even more worrying for Taiwan is the fact 
that this alleged neglect has “led to (…) blunt warnings that Taiwan [can] not count on 
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 Importantly, The TRA is US national law. 
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the US to defend it in a crisis if it [is] not willing to shoulder a larger share of the 
burden of protecting its own security (Chase 2008b: 722).
49
 
 
Against this backdrop, the abovementioned senior SEF official – the one who labeled 
China‟s SRBMs a „symbolic threat‟– explained to the author that an important reason 
why Taiwan needs a capable defense is because it sends a clear message to the US 
(Interview, May 12, 2010). Similarly, when asked about the connection between 
Taiwan‟s hard and soft military power, Dr. Lu stated that “if you can convince the US 
public that our defense is responsible, that gives a very good impression” (Interview, 
May 17, 2010). In other words, US inclination to support Taiwan seems to increase 
along with the latter‟s capability to defend itself. Although such a correlation might 
appear somewhat paradoxical, it is also perfectly conceivable in the sense that one is 
arguably more inclined (attracted) to support someone who does not take one‟s support 
for granted. 
 
The most direct, effective and important way in which Taiwan can assure the US of its 
own military seriousness and credibility is arguably through weapon purchases.
50
 In 
the words of Ambassador Teng at NPF, “arms purchases from the US are like an 
insurance premium” (Interview, May 19, 2010). However, this should not be 
understood as saying that Taiwan is allowed to purchase whatever weapons they want 
form the US. By far the most notable examples in this regard are the continuously 
requested – and repeatedly rejected – diesel submarines and F-16C/D aircrafts. The 
abovementioned senior naval officer held that these purchases seem highly unlikely to 
be carried out anytime soon, and commented that “we are not too happy with the US 
[for not selling]. We feel like a beautiful lady who is taken out for dinner by her 
boyfriend, but when we want to order beef, the boyfriend says no” (Interview, May 13, 
2010). The colonel and senior defense researcher (also referred to above) agreed that 
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 Along these lines, the reader should keep in mind what was mentioned in footnote 4 regarding US voices 
questioning the security commitment to Taiwan. Besides, it is worth noting here that proponents of such „un-
commitment‟ often point to the recent cross-strait détente to argue that US support is not needed as much as 
before (Ross/China Brief, Oct 22, 2009; and Waldron/China Brief, October 22, 2010).  
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 Of course, weapon sales to Taiwan have an economic aspect as well as a military one. 
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Taiwan‟s chances of purchasing submarines and aircrafts are slim, and suggested that it 
will probably have to rely on domestic production if they want to acquire them 
(Interview, May 15, 2010).
51 52
 
 
The above suggests that there is a significant grey area between what the US sees as 
Taiwanese neglect of its own security on the one hand, and what it sees as Taiwan 
exacting its own weapon demands on the other. Again, the distinction between 
defensive and offensive weapons is central. As Ross (China Brief, October 22, 2009) 
points out, there has always been “much debate within the US government about what 
exactly constitutes „appropriate‟ defensive weapons”, as called for in the TRA. While 
technical discussions about the nature of different weapon systems are certainly better 
left to others, the main point here is that while the US is required – through national 
law – to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character”, it also worries that 
providing Taiwan with offensive capabilities could have a destabilizing effect on cross-
strait relations. Illustrative in this regard is the US opposition against Taiwan 
developing offensive counterstrike missiles (Chase, China Brief, July 27, 2007). Along 
these lines, Dr. Lu specified that the extent to which Taiwan appears militarily 
attractive to the US is largely dependent on convincing the latter that Taiwan‟s military 
is essentially defensive in nature (Interview, May 17, 2010). 
 
It is worth adding briefly that in addition to weapon purchases, some interviewees – 
most notably the abovementioned senior naval officer – also stressed the importance of 
Taiwan‟s defense budget as a channel through which Taiwan is able to signal 
credibility and seriousness vis-à-vis the US (Interviews, May 12-21, 2010). Chase 
(China Brief, July 17, 2008c) supports this argument, holding that “raising the defense 
budget reflects Taiwan‟s commitment to its security, which helps improve [relations] 
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 Taiwan already has a fleet of domestically produced aircrafts (the IDF). Also, it is in fact currently being 
speculated that Taiwan has restarted a program to build indigenously designed diesel submarines (See for 
example Hsiao, China Brief, April 16, 2009). Finally, there have in fact been some signs lately that the US is 
considering the F-16 sale, but this is not confirmed. 
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 Not all observers agree about the necessity of these weapons. For example, the before-mentioned colonel and 
senior defense researcher assessed the submarines to be useful, but doubted the effect of F-16 C/Ds on grounds 
that it would be quite easy for China to bomb Taiwan‟s runways, in which case the aircrafts would be useless. 
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with the US”. 
 
Neither purchasing weapons nor increasing one‟s defense budget brings forth 
immediate soft power associations. However, although they both certainly contribute 
to strengthening Taiwan‟s military capabilities in hard power terms, they also seem 
capable of making the US more inclined to support Taiwan – not mainly through 
coercion or inducement, but through attraction. That is, a strong Taiwanese defense 
seems to be more attractive to the US than a weak one, suggesting once again that 
Taiwan‟s hard and soft power interplay and reinforce each other.53 As was the case in 
relation to China above, the following section briefly links these findings to Taiwan‟s 
current defense policies – as well as the US‟ response to them – before the final power 
assessment is carried out. 
 
Taiwan‟s „Hard ROC‟ defensive posture (outlined above) seems to appeal well to the 
US‟ preoccupation with defensive weapons. In addition, Taiwan‟s $6.4 billion arms 
purchase in January – as well as a pledge from President Ma to increase Taiwan‟s 
defense budget to 3 percent of GDP – arguably sends a clear message to the US that 
Taiwan is willing to shoulder responsibility for its own security.
54
 
 
Furthermore, the arms sale is highly illustrative of the US‟ continuing commitment to 
Taiwan‟s security.55 According to Bush (The Washington Times, September 8, 2010), 
“the logic behind the sale is simple: China has increased the island‟s vulnerability 
[through its military build-up]; at the request of Taiwan, the Obama administration 
seeks to reduce the islands insecurity”. Romberg (China Leadership Monitor, no. 31, 
2010a: 4) similarly claims that the sale is in line with consistent policies of “raising the 
cost of military conflict (…) and hence contribute to maintenance of peace and 
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 The abovementioned notion of „binary opposites‟ plays an important part here as well, especially in relation to 
Taiwan being a democracy and the US being a somewhat self-proclaimed defender of such. However, this will 
be dealt with mainly in the chapter on political power. 
54
 It is both relevant and interesting to note here that Ma in April told the CNN that “Taiwan will never ask the 
United States to fight against China on its behalf” (CNN, April 30, 2010), causing a lot of controversy in Taiwan. 
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 In illustrative contrast stands the US decision in 2007 to freeze all arms sales to Taiwan because of the latter‟s 
long-lasting indecisiveness about carrying out a purchase that was originally approved by the US 2001 (Chase 
2008b).  
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stability in the Western Pacific”. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, Romberg (Ibid) 
stresses that “part of the logic [behind the sale] was to strengthen President Ma‟s 
credibility”, illustrating the influence Taiwan might have on US decision making.56 
 
In sum, by strengthening its military capabilities (hard power), Taiwan simultaneously 
increases its attractiveness (soft power) vis-à-vis the US, which seems to increase the 
latter‟s inclination to supporting Taiwan. In other words, hard and soft military power 
work in the same direction – that is, smart military power. 
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 However, it is necessary to mention here – although it will be stressed in more detail later – that all 
interviewees conferred for this thesis were careful to highlight that in the end, US commitment to Taiwan‟s 
security depends on the US‟ assessment of what is in its own interest (Interviews May 10-21, 2010). Accordingly, 
it is also an important factor that as China continues its rapid rise, Taiwan might certainly play a part in US 
efforts to (1) restrain or contain China and (2) maintain its position in Asia (Rosen/Wall Street Journal, August 8, 
2010; and Waldron/China Brief, October 22, 2010). For example, Ms. Clinton recently stated that a peaceful 
resolution of competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea is in the US „national interest‟, a response to 
a Chinese statement that Beijing‟s claims to the South China Sea are on a par with those to Taiwan. 
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4 Taiwan’s Economic Power 
 
This chapter seeks to assess Taiwan‟s smart economic power and takes a similar 
approach as the last one. It starts out by discussing the ways in which economic 
resources constitute power. Second, the uneven economic distribution across the strait 
is laid out. Based on these two sections, the third one examines Taiwan‟s economic 
power through hard-, soft- and smart power lenses. 
 
4.1 The nature of economic power 
 
As touched upon before, economic resources naturally make up an essential 
component in a country‟s hard power arsenal. For one thing, the „latent power aspect‟ 
reminds us that states “need money (…) to build military forces and fight wars” 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 55), and the fall of the Soviet Union – largely resulting from 
insufficient economic resources to sustain an arms race with the US – is an illustrative 
case in point. Furthermore, economic resources are certainly able to coerce and induce 
without taking such a military detour; bribes, payments, freezing of bank accounts and 
sanctions are notable examples in this regard (Nye 2004: 5-6, 99). 
 
At the same time – and somewhat similar to what was stressed in relation to the 
military aspect in the previous chapter – Nye (2004: 33) states that “economic prowess 
contributes not only to wealth, but also to reputation and attractiveness”. Hence, “a 
successful economy is [also] an important source of attraction” (Nye 2007: 165). 
Indeed, it is perfectly conceivable that countries might be drawn to successful 
economies without being actively coerced or induced. As Mead (2004: 25) notes, 
economic power is “sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels (…) A set of 
economic institutions and policies attracts others into [one‟s] system and makes it hard 
for them to leave”. 
 
Furthermore, the dividing lines between economic attraction, inducement and coercion 
40 
 
are certainly blurry. In what situations can we rightfully claim that I am being attracted 
and shaped by your economic system, policies or values? And when am I rather being 
induced – or even coerced – by your economic strength? A current and relevant 
illustration of this grey area is how the so-called „Beijing consensus‟ arguably works 
through all three mechanisms, and how it is difficult (at best) to determine where 
exactly to draw the line between them.
57
 
 
It should be added that Taiwanese scholars usually define economic power in softer 
terms than does Nye (Lu 2007: 3-4). Illustratively, while Nye (2004: 5-6, 31) classifies 
development- and humanitarian aid as hard power behavior, Dr. Lu stated in 
conversation with the author that “sanctions are hard, while aid is soft” (Interview, 
May 17, 2010). Similarly, Dr. Lee Chyungly at NCCU suggested the following and 
quite straightforward categorization: “when you use [economic resources] for yourself, 
[they are] hard; when you use [them] for others, [they] are soft (Interview, May 17, 
2010). In essence, there is a difference – as well as an obvious overlap – between 
buying support on the one hand, and gaining it on the other. 
 
In any case, although “sometimes in real-world situations, it is difficult to distinguish 
what part of an economic relationship is comprised of hard and soft power” (Nye 2007: 
166), it seems reasonable to agree that “economic resources can produce both hard and 
soft behavior” (Ibid: 165). Furthermore, the question of which of the two provides the 
agent with more leverage will depend largely on the context. In other words – and 
similar to what was the case in the previous chapter – when studying an economic 
power relationship, it is not sufficient to compare economic resources and assess how 
many weapons they are able to buy and how much coercive or inducive leverage they 
are able to produce – although this is certainly an important part of it, which is dealt 
with in the following section. Once again, the point is that such a strict focus on hard 
leverage does not tell us much about whether this leverage is likely to be applied or not, 
and hence it does not necessarily give us the full picture. In this respect, attraction (soft 
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power) might play a part, and hence we need to look at how hard and soft economic 
power interplay, possibly constituting smart economic power. 
 
Against this backdrop, Dr. Lee held that economic power is the key if one wants to 
investigate Taiwan‟s smart power, since “economic power can be both hard and soft, 
depending on how it is being projected” (Interview, May 17, 2010). Accordingly, this 
chapter now turns to assess Taiwan‟s economic power as a function of the above 
reflections. For obvious reasons, it will look predominantly at Taiwan‟s economic 
relationship and engagements with China, but the US factor will be touched upon as 
well, as well as other parts of the global community. 
 
4.2 Economically weak and dependent? 
 
Earlier this year – after about three decades of massive economic growth – China 
overtook Japan as the world‟s second largest economy behind the US. And although 
the last 30 years have certainly seen an impressive economic development on the other 
side of the Taiwan Strait as well, Tsang (2008: 10) points out that “what economic 
achievements Taiwan has made cannot but pale in significance (…) when they are 
compared with the mesmerizing rise of China (…)”. In short, Taiwan‟s economy 
obviously dwarfs compared to China‟s, and the latter‟s military build-up following its 
rapid economic rise (as pointed out in the previous chapter) illustrates quite well the 
importance of this factor in „latent military terms‟.58  
 
As significant as sheer size is the level of cross-strait economic integration. Economic 
links between Taiwan and China started to develop in the early 80s, and the process 
has continued in a rapid pace since then, making the two economies tightly interwoven 
as of 2010 (Cheng 2005; Gy 2005; Hu 2006; Kao 2009; and Tanner 2007). Today, 
China is Taiwan's number-one export market, its main venue for foreign investment, 
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 The latest figures from CIA World Factbook (2009 est.) show a Chinese GDP (official exchange rate) of 
$4.909 trillion, compared to Taiwan‟s $379 billion. 
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and the production base for many of its profitable exports, most notably in the IT 
sector. In addition, somewhere between 750.000 and one million Taiwanese live and 
work in China. As a senior official in the Taiwanese MoFA, Research and Planning 
Committee told the author, “China is now an economic superpower – Taiwan cannot 
ignore the rise of China” (Interview, May 12, 2010). 
 
This naturally raises questions about interdependence, and Keohane and Nye (1977) 
famously hold that where there is an asymmetry between buyers‟ and sellers‟ 
dependence, the more dependent party is more vulnerable, which can be used as a 
source of coercive power by the less dependent party. Accordingly, Burdekin and 
Whited (2009) have assessed the cross-strait economic relationship based on a number 
of variables, and conclude that the effects of “China variables” on Taiwan are indeed 
stronger than vice versa. Tanner (2007, Summary: xiii) argues along the same lines, 
labeling the cross-strait relationship one of “asymmetric interdependence (…), [where] 
Taiwan depends on the mainland market for a higher percentage and a far broader 
range of its economic activities than the mainland depends on Taiwan”.59 
 
In sum, China is not only economically superior to Taiwan in relative hard power 
terms, but also plays a vital role in Taiwan‟s own economy. Taken together, this 
suggests that Taiwan is running the risk of becoming economically dependent on 
China, and hence the following looks into what economic tools – hard, soft and smart 
– Taiwan possesses in terms of escaping such a role of an overly dependent party. 
 
4.3 Taiwan‟s smart economic power 
 
It is necessary to stress from the beginning that because of an impressive economic 
development over the last half-century – often labeled the „Taiwan miracle‟ – Taiwan 
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is today the world‟s 18th largest economy by PPP-adjusted GDP (25th by nominal GDP) 
and the world‟s 16th largest trading nation. In other words, despite China‟s relative 
economic strength, Taiwan‟s hard economic power resources are certainly not 
insignificant. The question, then, is how softer aspects interplay with these resources? 
And in the next instance, how the interplay between them shapes the equation that 
makes up the total scope of Taiwan‟s economic power? 
 
In terms of general economic attractiveness, Goldstein (2008: 41) holds that Taiwan‟s 
„economic miracle‟ also constitutes a core element of its soft power, and points out 
among other things that Taiwan ranks quite high on various global economic indexes 
(Ibid: 45). Similarly, several interviewees conferred for this thesis stressed the soft 
power inherent in Taiwan‟s successful adoption of a liberal market economy, and 
pointed out how this helps Taiwan build global support by cultivating its image as a 
responsible economic player.
60
 Notable in this regard is Larus (2006: 42) showing that 
Taiwan is often able to join global and regional economic organizations where 
statehood is not a requirement – WTO and APEC being the most prominent 
examples.
61
 
 
On the one hand, then, Taiwan‟s tangible (and quite considerable) economic muscles 
contribute to induce the international community into desiring trade and economic 
cooperation with Taiwan. On the other, Taiwan‟s appeal to currently broadly accepted 
economic values and practices helps strengthening its economic attractiveness, 
reputation and support – thus making its „product‟ more „sellable‟. In other words, hard 
and soft economic power seem to interact and strengthen each other, constituting smart 
economic power. 
 
However, there is little doubt that in order for Taiwan‟s smart economic power to reach 
out to the international community in this way, it depends to a considerable extent on 
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Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu‟ (Often abbreviated „Chinese Taipei‟), respectively. 
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China accepting it. (For example, one often talks about China „granting‟ Taiwan 
membership in organizations.) Put differently, it is crucial for Taiwan that China does 
not apply its leverage to seek to isolate Taiwan economically. A central question is 
therefore whether and to what extent Taiwan is able to counter such economic isolation. 
Given China‟s special interest in Taiwan – coupled with the considerable cross-strait 
economic imbalance outlined above – such a task certainly appears quite a challenge. 
Hence, the following section devotes some special attention to Taiwan‟s economic 
power vis-à-vis China. 
 
4.3.1 Taiwan’s smart economic power vis-à-vis China 
 
Again, it is useful to start by acknowledging that although cross-strait economic 
interdependence is arguably uneven, Taiwan is certainly not insignificant for China in 
hard economic terms. According to PRC Ministry of Commerce statistics from 
October 2008, trade with Taiwan accounts for 5.2% of China‟s total trade, making 
Taiwan China‟s 7th biggest trading partner.62 Besides, the same source tells us that 
during the first eight months of 2010, China saw a 57.5% increase in its exports to 
Taiwan, as well as a 50.5% increase in its imports. 
 
Turning to the attractive aspect, Hu (2006) points out that Beijing shifted to an 
economic-oriented Taiwan strategy after the 16
th
 party congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in 2002. All interviewees conferred for this thesis also 
stressed the „economy card‟ as the key element in China‟s current policies towards 
Taiwan, which basically refers to China being eager to develop economic integration 
across the strait, hoping that this will have a spillover effect into the political realm. As 
a SEF senior official told the author, “China assesses economic ties to be a good thing, 
because independence will seemingly have a higher cost for Taiwan” (Interview, May 
12, 2010). 
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 The US-China Business Council‟s statistics for 2009 ranks Taiwan number five. 
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The question of whether such a spillover effect from economics to politics is in fact 
likely will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. For the purpose here, the essence is 
that cross-strait economic cooperation seems to be highly attractive to China. In 
combination with the hard economic figures referred to above, this suggests that 
economic incentives across the strait – both hard and soft – are certainly running in 
both directions. Keeping in mind Keohane and Nye‟s concept of interdependence, this 
might have important implications for how one assesses the distribution of economic 
power. A useful case in terms of assessing these implications a bit closer is the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was signed by Taiwan 
and China on June 29
th
 this year.
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4.3.1.1 The ECFA case 
 
Rosen and Wang (2010: 2) point out that “China is frank in stating that it supports an 
ECFA undertaking because it believes this will maximize the prospect for eventual 
political integration across the Taiwan Strait”, which goes well with how China‟s 
current Taiwan strategy was presented above. Furthermore, there are three ECFA-
related observations in particular that might serve to support the above suggestion that 
China‟s attraction to cross-strait economic cooperation provides Taiwan with economic 
leverage. 
 
First – and most basically – it is interesting to note that the ECFA was largely initiated 
and pushed through by Taiwan (Cooke/China Brief, May 27, 2009; and Lin/Reuters, 
June 24, 2010). Second, most observers seem to agree that the agreement – in strict 
(and measurable) economic terms – is in fact more favorable for Taiwan than for 
China (Rosen and Wang 2010: 2-3; Shen/PeaceNet, March 30, 2010; and Wang 2010), 
a point that has been emphasized quite strongly from China‟s side, as illustrated by the 
following statement from a spokeswoman for the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO): “No 
matter how one measures it, the Chinese Mainland receives far less benefit than the 
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46 
 
Taiwan side” (Romberg/China Leadership Monitor, No. 33, 2010c: 2).64 Third, strong 
voices in Taiwan (mostly from the DPP side) have been pushing for letting a 
referendum decide whether or not to adopt the ECFA (Cohen & Chen/South China 
Morning Post, July 7, 2010; and Romberg/China Leadership Monitor, no. 32, 2010b). 
While no such referendum has been held, the Taiwanese minister of economic affairs 
has clearly stated that if it were to take place and reject the ECFA, Taiwan “would 
notify the Mainland, in accordance with a termination clause, to have the agreement 
terminated within a certain period of time” (See The China Post, May 6, 2010). Taken 
together, these examples imply quite strongly that China is not dictating Taiwan‟s 
economic policies. 
 
Obviously, however, the fact that China appears to be attracted to cross-strait economic 
integration is of little help to Taiwan if China‟s intention is to use such integration 
coercively as soon as Taiwan has reached a satisfactory level of economic dependence. 
So the next question becomes whether such coercive measures are likely. That is, what 
are the rules of the game, so to say, and perhaps even more importantly, who sets these 
rules? 
 
According to Rosen and Wang (2010: 2), Beijing officials‟ trust in cross-strait 
economic ties spilling over into the political realm “is rooted not in the idea that ECFA 
would enhance their ability to coerce Taiwan, but in the view that it would maximize 
mutual prosperity and Taiwan‟s perception of common interests, thereby establishing 
the goodwill necessary to facilitate political rapprochement in the future”. Similarly, 
Wang (2010: 1) holds that the “ECFA can be seen (…) as a part of an effort by Beijing 
to win the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan by tangibly contributing to the 
island‟s economic growth”. And finally, Romberg (China Leadership Monitor, no. 33, 
2010c: 11) also points to “winning hearts and minds on the island” as the main reason 
for China‟s “strong motivation to help Taiwan‟s economy”. 
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 Importantly, this should not be understood as saying that the ECFA is necessarily overall favorable to Taiwan. 
There are certainly strong voices in Taiwan (mostly from the DPP side) claiming that ECFA is rather a sign of 
China absorbing and marginalizing Taiwan economically (See for example Taipei Times, April 21, 2010). 
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Of course, one cannot automatically and blindly trust whatever Beijing declares to be 
its economic intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan – after all, it is not at all difficult to see how 
such a seemingly soft agenda could perfectly well be accompanied by a hard (and 
hidden) one. 
65
However, the above might still suggest that a Taiwanese appeal to cross-
strait economic cooperation appears attractive to China, resulting in increased 
goodwill from the latter. (Besides, the trade statistics show that China has much to gain 
in strict economic terms as well.) Taken together – although it is arguably difficult to 
make an exact distinction between inducement and attraction – it is probably safe to 
say that both hard and soft power matter in the cross-strait economic game, and that 
the interplay between them seem to give Taiwan some economic leverage vis-à-vis 
China.  
 
It was mentioned above how China to some extent constitutes a gatekeeper for 
Taiwan‟s access to the global economic scene. As the SEF senior official stated, 
“Taiwan is very strongly connected to world trade, and now that all countries rush to 
China, Taiwan needs close economic relations with China in order to connect with the 
world” (Interview, May 12, 2010). Accordingly, it is important here to address the 
ECFA‟s significance beyond cross-strait relations, and a big controversy revolves 
around whether or not Taiwan will be allowed to enter into FTAs with other countries 
– most notably ASEAN members – once the ECFA is signed.66 
 
Taiwanese officials, including President Ma, have stated that Taiwan is indeed entitled 
to signing such FTAs (See for example Focus Taiwan News Channel, June 2, 2010), 
and on August 5
th
, Taiwan and Singapore acknowledged that they are exploring the 
possibility of an economic agreement „on a par with an FTA‟ (Bower & Freeman 
2010).
67
 Although China‟s final response to this claim is yet to be determined (Rosen 
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 Accordingly, Hickey (2009) notes that it is still too early to say whether China‟s new policies represent a 
paradigm shift or not. 
66
 An FTA between ASEAN and China entered into force on January 1
st
 this year, which naturally gave rise to 
concern in Taiwan that it will be marginalized if it is not able to sign similar agreements with ASEAN. 
67
 In a recent interview with Associated Press (AP), President Ma also stressed that Taiwan is currently 
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& Wang 2010; Shen/PeaceNet, March 30, 2010; and Wang 2010), it is interesting to 
note that a PRC foreign ministry spokesman noted in June that China does “not object 
to non-governmental economic and trade exchanges between Taiwan and countries 
having diplomatic relations with China, but we firmly oppose any forms of official 
contact with Taiwan” (Romberg/China Leadership Monitor, No. 33, 2010c: 5). 
 
Furthermore, keeping in mind the points raised above, it is interesting to note Wang‟s 
(2010: 3) argument that “while Beijing may hope to win the hearts and minds of the 
people in Taiwan through ECFA, suspicion that China is in fact seeking to isolate 
Taiwan to increase its own leverage to advance reunification will seriously harm that 
effort. To dispel such doubts, Beijing will need to go beyond its tepid response to 
Taiwan‟s quest for additional FTAs”.68 
 
The above suggests that Taiwan‟s economic power vis-à-vis China consist in a 
combination (interplay) of tangible economic inducements (trade), and an appeal to 
China‟s attraction to cross-strait cooperation. In short, this smart economic power 
seems to put China in a dilemma. On the one hand, showing goodwill towards Taiwan 
could help Beijing win Taiwanese hearts and minds. On the other, however, such 
goodwill could arguably contribute to depicting Taiwan as an independent actor – as 
illustrated by bilateral FTAs or participation in international organizations. 
 
Finally, it is interesting against this backdrop to note President Ma‟s general policy of 
pushing strongly for economic cooperation while keeping politics in the background, 
once again constituting a clear contrast to former president Chen (Romberg/China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 26, 2008b; and no. 28, 2009a).
69
 This will be addressed in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
“discussing trade arrangements with the US, Japan and Indonesia” (AP, October 19, 2010). 
68
 Of course, Taiwan‟s ability to establish closer economic relations with ASEAN is not depending exclusively 
on China‟s attitude. Lin (2008) stresses how Taiwan has been facing problems gaining leverage towards ASEAN 
countries. Besides, interviewees conferred for this thesis disagreed whether ECFA it will lead to FTAs or not. 
69
 In addition to ECFA, the opening of direct cross-strait flights and the loosening of restrictions on tourism are 
notable examples of such non-political ties. 
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4.3.2 Taiwan’s smart economic power vis-à-vis the US 
 
When it comes to Taiwan, a picture is rarely complete without taking the US factor 
into consideration, and the economic realm is no exception. Once again, it is useful to 
start by acknowledging the presence and importance of hard power elements in 
Taiwan-US economic relations. The US Census Bureau‟s latest trade statistics lists 
Taiwan as the US‟ 9th largest trading partner (Taiwan places third on the US‟ list), and 
in addition, US exports to Taiwan rose 68% between January and August 2010 
(Rosen/Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2010). Still, as Sino-US economic relations are 
currently getting increasingly important, Taiwan could arguably use more leverage vis-
à-vis the US – that is, soft as well as hard. 
 
In terms of attractiveness, Taiwan‟s abovementioned appeal to liberal market values is 
of particular importance. Keeping in mind that many observers – as well as 
interviewees conferred for this thesis – see Taiwan‟s economic miracle as one of its 
main sources of soft power (Goldstein 2008; and Interviews May 12-May 21, 2010), it 
should be stressed how the TRA states that it is the policy of the US to “maintain the 
capacity (…) to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the (...) economic system, of the people on Taiwan” (TRA: Section 2, b, 6, 
author‟s italics). This suggests that Taiwan‟s appeal to shared economic values – that is, 
liberal market economy – might add attractive leverage to the inducement of trade.70 
 
It is worth noting that although some observers have stressed that the US has good 
reasons to be sceptical of the ongoing economic rapprochement across the strait – out 
of fear that closer cross-strait ties could push the US to the sidelines – all interviewees 
conferred for this thesis emphasized that the US draws a clear line between economics 
and politics, and hence that it does not put any restrictions on Taiwan‟s economic 
dealings with China. On the contrary, several interviewees argued that cross-strait 
economic integration and cooperation is warmly welcomed by the US since it 
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 Tunsjø‟s (2008) notion of binary opposites might once again play a role. 
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contributes to bringing stability to the region. Illustrative in this regard is the fact that 
the US has been highly supportive of the ECFA (Cooke/China Brief, July 17, 2008; 
Cooke/China Brief, May 27, 2009; Cooke/ China Brief, February 18, 2010; Rosen & 
Wang 2010; Taiwan Today, April 8, 2010).
71
 
 
4.3.3 Soft power or hard cash? 
 
The interplay between hard and soft economic power arguably becomes particularly 
clear in the field of development- and humanitarian aid. Illustratively, Larus (2008) 
categorizes Taiwan‟s economic assistance as a way of buying support 
(inducement/hard power), but still concludes that this “appears to be useful only so 
long as it has been coupled with [interplay with] soft power” (Ibid: 187-188). This 
seems to be in line with the abovementioned Taiwanese way of defining aid as an 
important source of Taiwan‟s soft power as long as it is based on altruism. Accordingly, 
Dr. Kan emphasized that there is a large power potential in Taiwanese aid as long as 
the incentives are not political: “If it is for humanitarian reasons – that is, if the goal is 
not to win diplomatic allies – then Taiwan will win respect in the international 
community, and then, aid is more powerful than any military weapon” (Interview, May 
14, 2010).
72
 As an example of such power potential, Dr. Kan pointed to the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake: “victims from the earthquake – and mainlanders in general – were 
deeply touched by Taiwan‟s considerable aid relief efforts, and many of them stated 
bluntly that they would never again talk about using force against Taiwan” (Ibid). 
 
Similarly, an official in the Taiwanese semi-governmental development agency 
International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) told the author that they are 
often frustrated by questions about policy issues, since they create confusion around 
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 Also relevant here is the half-ongoing and half-shelved process concerning a Taiwan-US FTA, as touched upon 
above. Although no interviewees believed that such an agreement is likely to happen any time soon, many voices 
– in the US as well as Taiwan – have called for speeding up the process, stressing that chances are bigger to 
succeed now than in a long time because of the ECFA and because of President Ma‟s clear distinction between 
economics and politics (Cooke/China Brief, May 27, 2009; Taipei Times, May 10, 2010; Taipei Times, July 16, 
2010; The China Post, July 11, 2010; and Rosen/Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2010). 
72
 Again, President Ma‟s current policy of leaving diplomatic recognition (and politics in general) in the 
background is highly relevant. 
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the assistance‟s true intention (Interview, May 20, 2010).73 Chad Liu, a specialist at 
Tzu Chi – by far Taiwan‟s biggest aid organization – told the author that there is a big 
difference between “winning support and buying support” (Interview, May 20, 2010), 
and like Dr. Kan, he also pointed to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, emphasizing in 
particular the importance of Taiwanese volunteers in Sichuan being the first to arrive 
and the last to leave. Finally, in relation to Tzu Chi, it is interesting to add that a 
colonel and senior defense researcher (also referred to in the chapter on military power) 
noted that “Tzu Chi is Taiwan‟s most important power source. They show Taiwan to 
the world, and in this way they are a more important weapon than the military 
(Interview, May 15, 2010).
74
 
 
As noted before, there is certainly a large grey area between inducement and attraction 
within this field, but the main point is that the interplay between them – that is, smart 
economic power – seems to be highly effective in terms of shaping the interests of 
others. Furthermore, this is a field where Taiwan is arguably able to gain some 
leverage, since – as the ICDF official pointed out – “there are no boundaries for 
development- and humanitarian aid” (Interview, May 20, 2010). 
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 Arguably though, aid is never 100% apolitical, and the earthquake in Haiti (which is a diplomatic ally of 
Taiwan) is highly illustrative in this regard (See for example Erikson/China Brief, February 4, 2010; Harris/East 
Asia Forum, February 2, 2010; and Thompson/China Brief, September 10, 2009). 
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 Several interviewees similarly stressed that Taiwan‟s vibrant civil society – that is, NGOs like Tzu Chi – plays 
a particularly important part here. 
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5 Taiwan’s Political Power 
 
The two previous chapters dealt with areas that are usually defined largely in hard 
power terms. They started out with considerable military and economic imbalances, 
respectively, and then moved on to investigate how soft power interplays with the hard 
elements, and how such smart power increases Taiwan‟s leverage. The current chapter 
focuses on political power, and more specifically, on political power that is not 
grounded in military or economic resources – that is, intangible political power. Taking 
Joseph Nye‟s definition of soft power as its starting point, the chapter begins with a 
theoretical discussion about the main sources from which a country might draw soft 
power. Based on this discussion, the main section assesses the leverage and „softness‟ 
of Taiwan‟s (intangible) political power. 
 
5.1 The nature of soft power 
 
As noted before, Nye (2004: 11) identifies three main sources of a country‟s soft power, 
those being its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are 
seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Obviously, the three overlap to some 
extent – as the following will illustrate – but for the sake of structural clarity, they are 
still treated separately below. 
 
To start with culture, Nye (2004: 11) distinguishes between “high culture such as 
literature, art, and education, which appeals to the elites, and popular culture, which 
focuses on mass entertainment”. Next, he states that when a country has cultural 
appeal, it “increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the 
relationships of attraction and duty that it creates” (Ibid). In other words, if I am 
attracted to you culturally, I am more likely to support you politically. In terms of high 
culture, educational exchange is often held to be the most prominent example of a 
country‟s soft power potential (Nye 2004: 41-43), while movies, sports and music are 
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examples of soft power sources within popular culture (Ibid: 46-55). Importantly, the 
cultural aspect of soft power has received a good deal of criticism (Fan 2008; Ferguson 
2003; and Hall 2010). For example, it has been pointed out that cultural attraction is 
hard to define, that people within a country are attracted to different things, and that 
culture is not exclusively – or even primarily – in control of the government. The main 
criticism, however, revolves around skepticism concerning the concrete impact that 
cultural appeal has on specific policy outcomes.
75
 
 
Turning to the second source, Nye (2004: 17) holds that “soft power rests on some 
shared values”, and claims for example that “it is easier to attract people to democracy 
than to coerce them to be democratic” (Ibid). Again, the main idea is that if your 
political values are attractive to me, I will support you. One important criticism should 
be mentioned here. As Hall (2010: 204) points out, “sharing the same political values 
should (…) not automatically be equated with sharing the same foreign policy goals”. 
Put differently, it is highly plausible that I will care about defining your values as 
shared or attractive only if it suits me politically to do so, and hence it is difficult to tell 
when soft power is at play, and when it is simply a matter of shared interests or even 
political pressure.
76
 
 
Third, while political values refer to the underlying standards of a country‟s policies at 
home and abroad, foreign policy as a soft power resource refers to the specific way in 
which a country behaves to achieve its policy goals. As an example, Nye (2004: 61) 
holds that “policies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the 
national interest are easier to make attractive to others than policies that take a narrow 
and myopic perspective.” In other words, foreign policies will be attractive if they are 
framed in a way that is seen as legitimate by others. To this, Hall (2010: 204) 
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 For example, the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has pointed out that “Norway did not become a NATO 
member in 1949 because the first issue of Donald Duck & Co. was released in Norway in 1948” (Lundestad, 
lecture at University of Oslo, 2008). Moreover, Nye (2007: 164) similarly acknowledges that “drinking Coca-
Cola or wearing a Michael Jackson shirt does not necessarily convey power”, but also warns critics about 
committing the before-mentioned vehicle fallacy of “confus[ing] the resources that may produce behavior with 
the behavior itself”.  
76
 For the sake of the discussion below, it is necessary here to remind the reader about Mattern‟s (2007) claim 
that soft power is exercised by applying representational force, and hence might not always be so soft after all. 
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comments that the whole idea of an attractive foreign policy is somewhat tautological. 
That is, others will support your foreign policy if it is attractive, while its attractiveness 
is defined by whether or not it is supported by others. Hence, exactly “how or why 
other states accept the justification of a policy as „legitimate‟ remains unclear” (Ibid: 
205), since (once again) it might very well be a simple matter of self-interest rather 
than attraction. Accordingly, Fan (2008) holds that the soft power potential of a 
country‟s foreign policy basically lies in nation branding and public diplomacy.77 
 
Against this theoretical backdrop, the chapter now to turn to assess how it all plays out 
in the Taiwan‟s case. 
 
5.2 Taiwan‟s cultural power 
 
In terms of cultural appeal and attractiveness, it is important to note from the 
beginning that Taiwan is deeply divided culturally, which is closely related to its 
special status and situation.
78
 While some believe that “a unique Taiwanese (…) 
identity could deter China‟s attempt of annexation (…), others hold a different view 
and suggest that Taiwan should promote traditional (…) Chinese [culture] to compete 
with China over cultural attractiveness” (Lu 2007: 5).79 
 
Such cultural ambiguity might certainly be a considerable shortcoming in terms of 
projecting an attractive cultural image, and an illustrative case in point is the 
establishment of Taiwan Cultural Centers in large international cities. While the 
significance of these centers – set up in New York, Paris and Tokyo – was proudly 
presented to the author by a senior MoFA official (Interview May 12, 2010), Tsang 
(2010) holds that they are not only fruitless in terms of promoting Taiwanese culture, 
but might even be counterproductive, because their semi-resemblance to China‟s 
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 Fan (2003) holds that “public diplomacy is a subset of nation branding that focuses on the political brand of a 
nation; whereas nation branding is about how a nation as a whole reshapes international opinions”. Also, see Nye 
(2004: 107-110) on public diplomacy.  
78
 For a detailed account on the issue of Taiwan‟s identity, see Horowitz et.al. (2007). 
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 Simply put, the former view belongs to DPP and the latter to KMT. 
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Confucius Institutes is only confusing to people.
80
 Illustratively, even the above 
mentioned MoFA official admitted that Taiwan‟s cultural appeal easily dwarfs against 
(or drowns in) that of China, and hence that Taiwan‟s global cultural appeal faces 
severe difficulties. 
 
It is, however, interesting to note that several interviewees conferred for this thesis 
emphasized culture as an important source of Taiwan‟s soft power vis-à-vis China. For 
one thing, Dr. Lu pointed out how Taiwanese popular culture – in particular music and 
fashion – is gaining considerable ground among young people in China, and claimed 
that “this is likely to be an important aspect in the long run” (Interview, May 17, 
2010).
81
 Somewhat along the same lines, but in the realm of high culture, a colonel and 
senior researcher stressed the role that Chinese exchange students play in terms of 
absorbing Taiwan‟s cultural attractiveness (Interview, May 15, 2010).82 Finally, a SEF 
senior official emphasized the importance of mainland tourists bringing a positive 
cultural impression back to the mainland (Interview, May 12, 2010).
83
 
 
Applying Nye‟s theory, this implies (although somewhat weakly) that a positive 
impression of Taiwanese culture among Chinese people might attract an increasing 
number of the latter to support Taiwan, which in the next instance could affect China‟s 
policies. However, in line with the criticism mentioned earlier, interviewees agreed 
that this effect is not only difficult to measure, but also questionable in general, since 
culture appeal is likely to lose in conflict with other (heavier or harder) factors. 
 
So in sum, not only is competing culturally with China on the international stage an 
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 China is setting up such Confucius Institutes around the world in order to promote Chinese culture and 
language. As of July 2010, there were 316 Confucius Institutes and 337 Confucius Classrooms in 94 countries 
and regions. The Office of the Chinese Language Council International plans to set up 500 Confucius Institutes 
worldwide by 2010 in view of the fact that 100 million people oversees may be learning Chinese. 
81
 As a curiosity, it could be mentioned here that the Taiwanese golf player Yani Tseng was recently offered a $25 
million contract on the condition that she would get Chinese citizenship. (She rejected the offer.) 
82
 Interestingly, in August this year, the Taiwanese government passed law amendments that considerably 
liberalized restrictions on mainland students in Taiwan (See for example Asia Times, August 14, 2010 or 
Economic Observer, August 20, 2010).  
83
 Taiwan opened up to mainland tourism in 2008 and the number of visitors is increasing rapidly. A curiosity 
that could be mentioned here is that a colonel and senior researcher told the author that a number of these tourists 
are certainly spies, but that the positive effect for Taiwan is still much more important (Interview, May 15, 2010). 
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extremely difficult task for Taiwan (whether it competes as „a separate Taiwan‟ or as 
„the other China‟). In addition, whatever cultural attraction Taiwan might emit vis-à-
vis China does not seem to transfer easily into concrete policy changes. In other words, 
Taiwan‟s cultural power is certainly soft, but does not necessarily provide much 
leverage, and thus seems unlikely to make a big difference in Taiwan‟s political 
struggles – at least as an isolated factor. Furthermore, when talking about Taiwan‟s 
cultural appeal, interviewees often focused largely on the openness of Taiwanese 
society, which is arguably closer to Nye‟s second soft power category, namely political 
values. The next section deals with this aspect. 
 
5.3 The power of Taiwan‟s political values 
 
Tsang (2008: 9-10) claims that Taiwan‟s “most powerful instrument in external 
relations (…) is the soft power inherent in [its] impressive democratization”.84 Along 
the same lines, Dr. Kan told the author that “democracy is Taiwan‟s most powerful 
weapon” (Interview, May 14, 2010), while Dr. Lu argued that “democracy is the key 
(…), even if we are small, we can have some leverage” (Interview, May 17, 2010).” 
Importantly, however, Dr. Lu added that “it is difficult to know exactly how 
democracy translates into influence” (Ibid), and hence, this section seeks to assess the 
mechanisms through which democracy might make a difference for Taiwan in terms of 
political leverage. Main emphasis will naturally be on relations with China and the US, 
but Taiwan‟s diplomatic allies, as well as other members of the international 
community, will be touched upon as well. 
 
5.3.1 Taiwan’s democratic power vis-à-vis China 
 
Dr. Lu told the author that “democracy is an effective weapon because it challenges 
China‟s legitimacy” (Interview, May 17, 2010). Furthermore, he added that this is true 
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 Taiwan‟s democratization started in the 1980‟s and the first president election was held in 1996. For a detailed 
account, see Tsang and Tien (1999). 
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not only with regard to China‟s legitimacy over Taiwan, but also its domestic 
legitimacy. The following goes into some detail about these two „democracy effects‟. 
 
To start with the latter of the two – the issue of China‟s own political legitimacy – it is 
necessary to keep in mind Tunsjø‟s (2008: 88-91) emphasis on binary opposites, as 
touched upon in previous chapters. In essence, Taiwan‟s democracy represents a sharp 
contrast to China‟s authoritarian regime, thus constituting a direct threat to CCP rule. 
(Indirectly, such a threat is arguably enhanced by the fact that the contrast also 
contributes strongly to the construction of a separate Taiwanese identity, which is of 
vital political and cultural importance for Taiwan – on an individual- as well as 
government level.) Along these lines, a senior MoFA official stressed to the author the 
importance of “Taiwan representing China‟s political opposite” (Interview, May 12, 
2010), while Dr. Lai at TTT used even stronger words, claiming that “Taiwan 
represents a beacon of light for people in China and Hong Kong who fight for 
democracy” (Interview, May 13, 2010). 
 
Against this backdrop, it is easy to see the powerful message it sends when President 
Ma urges China to political reform, as exemplified by his call for the release Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo (Taipei Times, October 10, 2010). Furthermore, a SEF 
senior official claimed that “Taiwan‟s successful democratic development certainly 
influences perceptions on the mainland” (Interview, May 12, 2010). While such an 
effect is not easy to pinpoint or measure, Dr. Lu interestingly pointed to China‟s 
experiments with village elections as one example of democracy‟s appeal on the 
mainland. Also, several interviewees emphasized Taiwan‟s influence on Hong Kong‟s 
ongoing struggles for democracy, and how this process is capable of challenging CCP 
rule even further.  
 
The power potential lies here in the idea that China‟s support for Taiwan increases as a 
result of its attraction to Taiwan‟s democratic system – that is, a quite straightforward 
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soft power mechanism as defined by Joseph Nye.
85
 However, although interviewees all 
underlined the symbolic importance of this point, they also agreed that – as was the 
case when discussing culture above – the effect is not likely to be decisive by itself, 
since its importance easily diminishes in conflict with other factors. More specifically, 
sharing political values is not the same as sharing political goals, and hence, it is 
certainly not hard to imagine Chinese who are indeed pro-democracy, but who still 
claim sovereignty over Taiwan. As a colonel and senior defense researcher told the 
author, “if I were Chinese, I would never give up Taiwan” (Interview, May 15, 2010). 
 
Turning to the other way in which Taiwan‟s democracy challenges China‟s legitimacy 
– that is, its legitimacy over Taiwan – the essence here is that China is more or less 
forced to take Taiwan‟s voice into consideration for the simple (but powerful) reason 
that it is a democratic voice. (This argument becomes particularly strong when keeping 
in mind what has been noted before about China‟s preoccupation with winning 
Taiwanese hearts and minds.) Three specific examples can serve to illustrate this point. 
 
First, it is worth repeating what was mentioned in chapter four about the Taiwanese 
controversy revolving around whether or not to hold an ECFA referendum. The core 
point to draw from this is that if Taiwan were to reject the ECFA in a democratic 
referendum, China would have no choice but to take this (democratic) decision into 
account. (It would certainly be a whole lot easier for China to disregard such 
Taiwanese views if it could claim that they were not representative, valid or legitimate.) 
Second, several interviewees mentioned the so-called „DPP card‟ as a concrete 
example of Taiwan‟s democratic leverage. In brief, Beijing is very much aware of the 
fact that the Taiwanese people could end up electing a DPP president in the next 
election (which China does not want), and hence Chinese leaders are more inclined to 
play ball with President Ma, which could be exploited by the latter. 
 
Third, and by far most important, a SEF senior official noted that Taiwan‟s democracy 
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 For a detailed discussion about the chances of Taiwan‟s democracy spilling over to China, see Tsang and Tien 
(1999). 
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is creating “an environment where people can make a choice in a peaceful way” 
(Interview, May 12, 2010). Similarly, a MoFA official stressed that “any future 
reunification would have to be a democratic reunification (…), since Taiwan could 
never surrender its democratic sovereignty” (Interview, May 12, 2010). And perhaps 
even more „to the point‟, Dr. Lu stated that “democracy gives the [Taiwanese] people 
the final say of their own destiny” (Interview, May 17, 2010). In other words, as long 
as there is no Taiwanese majority favoring unification, any Chinese takeover would 
require Beijing to find arguments explaining why it would be legitimate to act against 
the democratic will of Taiwan. Such arguments would arguably be difficult to find, and 
accordingly, all interviewees agreed that a forced takeover seems to be a highly 
unlikely scenario at the moment. 
 
Again, it is necessary to spend some time on the mechanism through which this 
„democracy effect‟ works, especially because it seems to work differently from what 
was the case above. While Taiwan‟s leverage (or power) vis-à-vis China is still soft in 
the sense that it rests on an intangible resource (democracy) rather than money or 
weapons, it is in fact not so soft if attraction is the main criterion. That is, if China sees 
itself as somewhat forced to take Taiwan‟s voice into consideration (against its will) 
because of the power of democracy, this is rather a matter of coercion or threat 
(representational force) than it is a matter of attraction. In other words, while the 
former „democracy effect‟ was a quite straightforward case of soft power, hard and soft 
elements arguably interplay in the latter case, comprising smart power. Furthermore, 
interviewees conferred for this thesis agreed that the latter latter‟s leverage is 
considerably bigger than the former. 
 
Importantly, although such a democratic leverage seems powerful, it should not be 
taken as absolute, as illustrated well by China‟s reaction to former President Chen‟s 
struggles to achieve de jure independence – in which the „democracy card‟ played a 
leading role. For one thing, the ASL is relevant here, and indeed, Denmark and 
Fontaine (2009) hold that the ASL “shifted Beijing‟s focus (…) toward preventing 
[and deterring] de jure independence”. Furthermore, it is interesting to note China‟s 
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massive protests against Mr. Chen‟s UN referendum proposal in 2008, in which 
Taiwanese people were asked whether they wanted to apply for UN membership under 
the name „Taiwan‟.86 Along these lines, no interviewees doubted that China would take 
serious action if Taiwan (hypothetically) were to vote in favor of de facto 
independence. This suggests that the democracy effect is powerful within given limits 
or „red lines‟, and in this regard, three foundations of President Ma‟s current policies 
should be briefly laid out. 
 
First, regarding cross-strait policies, the so-called „three no‟s‟ promise that there will 
be “no unification, no independence and no use of force” in Mr. Ma‟s presidency (See 
for example Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2009). Second, in terms of bilateral 
relations, the notion of „flexible diplomacy‟ holds that Taiwan should “strengthen 
relations with major powers of the world, but does not have to win diplomatic allies 
just for the sake of winning” (The China Post, November 11, 2008). Third, in the area 
of international organizational representation, Taiwan has gone from actively seeking 
membership in UN bodies to seeking “meaningful participation in the activities of UN 
specialized agencies” (ROC MoFA Policy Repot, March 11, 2010), and has even 
pledged to be flexible over the contentious naming issue.
87
 
88
 
 
5.3.2 Taiwan’s democratic power vis-à-vis the US 
 
As noted in previous chapters, several observers argue that Taiwan‟s importance to the 
US is decreasing (Carpenter 2008: 155-183; and Waldron/China Brief, October 22, 
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 Simultaneously – as a response to the Chen/DPP proposal – the KMT put forward a proposal to bid for UN 
membership under the name „Republic of China‟, as Taiwan had done every year since 1993. Both proposals 
failed as a result of low turnout. 
87
 Illustratively, 2009 marked the first year since 1993 in which no bid for UN membership was made. (The 
absence of a bid was repeated in 2010.) Furthermore, it was announced in April 2009 that Taiwan would gain 
observer status (under the name „Chinese Taipei‟) in the World Health Assembly (WHA), which is the World 
Health Organization‟s (WHO) governing body. Hence, on May 18th 2009, Taiwan participated as an observer in 
the 62
nd
 WHA in Geneva, representing the first time Taiwan was allowed to participate in a meeting or activity of 
UN specialized agencies since it lost its UN seat to China in 1971. Furthermore, Taiwan‟s next goal is to join the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Interviewees conferred for this thesis all held that little progress has been made so far in terms of 
joining these two latter organizations. 
88
 Needless to say, these three policy foundations all represent clear shifts from former president Chen. 
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2010). However, Tsang (2008: 14) claims that “what has increased dramatically in 
Taiwan‟s importance to the USA is that the island is now a flagship for American 
inspired Asian democracy”. Similarly, Hickey (2008: 97) quotes a scholar who states 
that “the US does not need Taiwan strategically, but it needs Taiwan‟s democracy 
strategically”. 
 
Furthermore, Tunsjø (2008: 99) points out that “since the US has officially stated that 
it will “stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the 
reward of liberty for its people”, the US may have to choose between ignoring the 
democratic will of Taiwan or risk a conflict with China over Taiwan. Should the US 
turn its back on Taiwan, it would seriously damage the image of the US as a promoter 
of global democracy”. In line with this, all interviewees conferred for this thesis put 
strong emphasis on the role that democracy currently plays in the relationship between 
Taiwan and the US. As a colonel and senior defense researcher told the author, 
“Taiwan will maintain US support as long as it stays a democratic and free society” 
(Interview, May 15, 2010). Bombastic as this statement might be, it is certainly 
plausible as Lu (2007: 4) holds that “democracy is the best selling point when 
promoting Taiwan‟s image to the American public”. Illustratively, US President 
Barack Obama has stated that “I will do all that I can to support Taiwan‟s democracy 
in the years ahead” (The China Post, May 25, 2008).  
 
In terms of mechanisms in play, the general idea is that the US – as a strong supporter 
of democratic values – is attracted by Taiwan‟s de mocratic appeal, and that this 
attraction shapes US interest in terms of upholding its support of Taiwan. This would 
be soft power. However, the above-mentioned blurry line between attraction and 
coercion is highly relevant here as well. As Dr. Lu told the author, “it is very difficult 
for the US to abandon a democratic Taiwan” (Interview, May 17, 2010). In other 
words, one could possibly argue that the US is somewhat caught up in Taiwan‟s 
„democracy web‟, where the role of „democracy supporter‟ has turned into a strait 
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jacket – in which case it is all too tempting to call it a „Taiwan Strait jacket‟.89 If one 
argues along these lines, Taiwan‟s leverage starts smelling of coercion as much as 
attraction, and once again, smart power seems to be in play. 
 
It is, however, important to repeat that all interviewees conferred for this thesis were 
careful to stress that in the end, US‟ policies are grounded in US interests. As Dr. Lu 
stated, “it looks like Obama will support Taiwan‟s democracy, but you never know 
what the situation will be when another president takes over, since it will always 
depend on the US public and US interests” (Interview, May 17, 2010). Besides, one 
needs to keep in mind that the US – like China – did not support the abovementioned 
UN referendum, suggesting once again that the democracy effect is certainly not 
absolute. 
 
5.3.3 Taiwan’s democratic power vis-à-vis diplomatic allies and the international 
community 
 
Larus (2008) has investigated Taiwan‟s relations to its diplomatic allies, and although 
she “acknowledge[s] that Taiwan‟s financial assistance to its allies is an important 
factor in their decision to maintain diplomatic relations with it”, she nonetheless holds 
that “the key institution linking Taiwan with its diplomatic allies is democracy” (Ibid: 
156-157). As was the case in the section on development aid in the former chapter, it is 
certainly difficult to decide exactly where to draw the line between economic 
inducement and political attraction (and perhaps political coercion) in these cases. In 
any case, however, the leverage arguably lies in the way that they interplay and form a 
combination of smart power. Furthermore, despite being small, Taiwan‟s diplomatic 
allies might still play an important role in terms of enhancing Taiwan‟s legitimacy as a 
nation-state, mainly by “representing Taiwan in international forums where Taiwan‟s 
presence is prohibited” and by “providing [Taiwan‟s] government officials with the 
opportunity to make transit visits to the United States” (Ibid: 154). 
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 This is related to the so-called „credibility issue‟, having to do with whether or not Taiwan constitutes a litmus 
test for the US‟ credibility as an ally (Dumbaugh 2007). 
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In terms of Taiwan‟s democratic power vis-à-vis the international community, it is 
probably sufficient to quote Dr. Lai at TTT, who stated that “Taiwan‟s democracy 
makes it hard for the international community to abandon Taiwan” (Interview, May 13, 
2010). That is, the same mechanism that applied to the US above arguably applies to 
other parts of the international community as well.
 90
 
 
As a final note, it is necessary to stress that the „democracy effects‟ outlined in this 
section depends fundamentally on “Taiwan‟s ability to seize the moral high ground 
because of its democratic achievements” (Tsang 2008: 10). Obviously, what is 
considered „the moral high ground‟ is not written in stone, since “ideas are not (…) 
universal or immutable” (Nye 2007: 163). However, Nye (Ibid) adds that although 
democracy was not the prevalent idea in some passed eras, “[it] is certainly the 
prevalent idea of the current era”. 
 
5.4 The power of Taiwan‟s foreign policy  
 
Lu (2007: 6) argues that “multilateralism as a policy style constitutes one of Taiwan‟s 
soft power assets”. Given Taiwan‟s unique and isolated status, it obviously makes 
perfect sense to conduct foreign policies that focus on international cooperation. 
Illustratively, a SEF senior official told the author that “it is in everybody‟s interest to 
let Taiwan participate in the international community” (Interview, May 12, 2010).91 
Furthermore, the soft power potential (as defined by Nye above) lies in convincing 
others that these policies are legitimate. An obvious case in point is how former 
president Chen Shui-bian‟s active pursuit of independence was not met with much 
sympathy (attraction) abroad, and accordingly, Taiwan lost six diplomatic allies under 
his presidency, in addition to suffering from deteriorating relations with both China 
and the US. In contrast, President Ma‟s policies are widely accepted as legitimate, and 
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 Again, there are obviously limitations as to how big this effect is. For an account on such limitations vis-à-vis 
ASEAN, see Lin (2008). 
91
 Also, Taiwan‟s establishment of the Democratic Pacific Union is a case in point; see Larus (2006: 42). 
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indeed, Taiwan has lost no diplomatic allies since Mr. Ma‟s takeover, while relations to 
China and the US are better than in a long time. 
 
However, as stressed above, this type of argument is somewhat simplistic, since it can 
easily be met with claims of tautology. The fact that China and the US support 
President Ma‟s policies does not necessarily mean that these policies project power. 
That is, it could might as well mean that it is in China‟s and the US‟ interest to support 
them. Obviously, one might argue (somewhat rightfully) that in the end, Taiwan‟s 
choice of foreign policies is what really matters. That is, Taiwan can certainly conduct 
foreign policies that might strengthen its soft power, and indeed, several interviewees 
pointed to public diplomacy and nation branding as examples of this – particularly 
stressing the role of NGOs. As Dr. Lu told the author, “Taiwan‟s burgeoning civil 
society (…) and its role in international cooperation could help Taiwan to build a 
positive image abroad” (Interview, May 17, 2010). However, the point is nonetheless 
that it remains analytically problematic to see Taiwan‟s foreign policy as a source of 
soft power in itself, rather than a means of projecting it. 
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that many interviewees conferred for this thesis 
emphasized how soft power in general provides more leverage when not projected too 
actively. A senior MoFA official told the author that “there is no reason to remind 
China about our soft power, because they know it‟s there” (Interview, May 12, 2010). 
Similarly, Lai I-Chung in Taiwan Think Tank called Taiwan‟s soft power “invisible, 
but invincible”, and professor Kan at NCCU underlined that “Taiwan should not go 
about projecting its soft power too much, but rather be humble and let it work by itself” 
(Interview, May 14, 2010). In the words of Tsang (2010b), “don‟t make too much 
noise, just tell the truth – and make a virtue out of a necessity”. 
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6 Conclusions: Taiwan’s Elbowroom and Smart Power 
 
6.1 Empirical conclusions: Taiwan‟s elbowroom 
 
The three previous chapters investigated Taiwan‟s smart power in the military, 
economic and political realm, respectively. The current section moves up one level and 
assesses how Taiwan‟s leverage in these three realms combined makes up the total 
scope of its elbowroom. Hence, it is probably useful to start by repeating what was 
stressed in the introduction regarding Taiwan‟s objectives. That is, since Taiwan‟s end 
goal (unification vs. independence) is yet to be decided, its elbowroom is best 
understood as the total amount of leverage it is capable of obtaining while 
simultaneously biding time and avoiding that its future is determined against its will. 
 
6.1.1 Protecting its domain – ‘defensive elbowroom’ 
 
Arguably, the first and most basic question that one needs to address when assessing 
Taiwan‟s ability to determine its own future is to what extent it is capable of 
preventing a Chinese military takeover. Furthermore, the above has argued that this 
capability does not rest exclusively on the ROC Armed Forces‟ likelihood of 
triumphing in case of a cross-strait military confrontation – that is, on hard military 
power. In the words of President Ma, “only when relying on soft power can Taiwan 
resist China‟s missiles” (Ifeng News, June 6, 2008, author‟s translation). 
  
Along this line, Mr. Ma has also stated that “the most important strategy is to make the 
leadership in Beijing not even consider invading Taiwan” (AP, October 19, 2010), and 
a smart power framework suggests that such a strategy has a good chance of achieving 
its aim. Although there is no reason to repeat arguments that were made in previous 
chapters, the essence is that Taiwan seems to have the (smart) power to assure (1) that 
China cannot be certain of success in an attempted invasion, and (2) that a military 
takeover would not come without huge Chinese costs – both military, economic and 
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political ones. In other words, Taiwan arguably plays a crucial role in seriously 
reducing China‟s inclination to use force – what we might call „smart deterrence‟. 
 
Second, since a military attack seems highly unlikely at the moment, a more pressing 
question is probably whether Taiwan is able to resist China‟s strategy of using cross-
strait economic integration as a means of achieving political sovereignty over Taiwan. 
In this regard, the most important point to draw from previous chapters is that Taiwan 
appears to be highly capable of distinguishing clearly between economics and politics. 
That is, in order for economic ties to spill over into the political realm, Taiwan would 
arguably have to let them.
92
 Illustratively, President Ma recently noted that although he 
intends to keep encouraging economic ties, he does “not intend to push democratic 
Taiwan into a political agreement that would hasten Beijing‟s long-stated goal of 
unification” (AP, October 19, 2010). 
 
Third, on the political arena, it is worth noting that it looks like Taiwan has been able 
to stop – or at least pause – the trend of losing diplomatic allies to China. As of 
November 2010, all of the 23 countries that recognized the ROC at the time of 
President Ma‟s takeover in 2008 maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
Furthermore, nothing suggests that any of them will switch recognition anytime soon. 
 
Finally, it should be stressed once again that Taiwan‟s ability to maintain US support 
certainly plays a crucial part in all of the above. In this regard, the key point is how the 
combination of Taiwan‟s military, economic and political leverage seems to contribute 
well to assuring that the US keeps on wearing the „Taiwan Strait Jacket‟. 
 
In sum, this suggests that Taiwan‟s elbows are quite capable of resisting infringement. 
Put differently, its „defensive elbowroom‟ seems to be able to protect its de facto 
independence – that is, to assure status quo. 
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 As a curiosity, this would probably rely more on China‟s soft or hard power vis-à-vis Taiwan. 
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6.1.2 Expanding its domain – ‘offensive elbowroom’ 
 
Elbowroom should not be seen merely in defensive terms – to be sure, elbows might 
also serve as a means of expansion. For obvious reasons, this is not really an issue for 
Taiwan in the military realm, but on the political and economic arena, it is certainly 
relevant. Hence, the following will briefly assess whether – and to what extent – the 
findings in previous chapters suggest that Taiwan is able to create more political and 
economic elbowroom, respectively. 
 
Politically, the notion of „red lines‟ is central. In short, although previous chapters 
have suggested that Taiwan‟s leverage is quite strong in some areas, it seems highly 
insufficient – vis-à-vis both China and the US – in terms of pushing for de jure 
independence. Obviously, Taiwan‟s success in gaining observer status in the WHA 
might be taken as a sign of flexibility, but at the same time, the slow (if any) progress 
regarding expansion from the WHA to the ICAO and UNFCCC shows that this is still 
an extremely sensitive and difficult issue.  
 
On the economic arena, however, the picture is different. As noted above, President 
Ma‟s policies have shown that Taiwan is able to draw a clear line between the 
economic and political realm, which arguably has important implications for its ability 
to create elbowroom in the former of the two. That is, while China might successfully 
legitimize arguing against Taiwanese political representation, it is certainly more 
difficult to deny Taiwan economic space, which is illustrated well by the controversy 
revolving around the signing of bilateral FTAs. Besides, President Ma‟s policy of 
„economics first‟ – and the ECFA case in particular – suggests that Taiwan contributes 
to „setting set the agenda‟ in the political realm. 
 
In short, Taiwan might be capable of creating more economic elbowroom, while the 
prospects for political expansion seem limited. In other words, one might claim that 
Taiwan‟s smart power provides more „defensive‟ than „offensive elbowroom‟.  
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6.1.3 Total scope of elbowroom and future development 
 
The above suggests that Taiwan is indeed capable of „biding time‟, as has been 
stressed as an important factor regarding Taiwan‟s ability to determine its own future. 
Hence, it is tempting to ask; whose side is time on? On the one hand, it makes sense 
when Tsang (South China Morning Post, June 18, 2010a) states that “as a rising super 
power, China should feel confident that time is on its side”. On the other hand, 
however, it is interesting to note that all interviewees conferred for this thesis stressed 
that China is not at all impatient in terms of unification (Interviews, May 10-21, 2010). 
That is, as long as Taiwan is not pushing for de jure independence, leaders in Beijing 
sleep well at night, because they have more pressing issues to deal with. (Naturally, the 
same goes for the US, who is happy to see peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.)
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Furthermore, one should keep in mind what was stressed in the introduction regarding 
Chinese (and US) policies not being written in stone, and illustratively, Romberg 
(China Leadership Monitor, no. 33, 2010c: 10) points out that China has “sharply 
limited its definition of what activity in the realm of “Taiwan independence” would 
provoke its use of force”. Against this backdrop, the findings of this thesis might 
suggest that as long as Taiwan doesn‟t step on any red lines, it may be able to push 
them. Some argue that accepting a de jure status is a sign of marginalization rather 
than elbowroom. Still, fear of finlandization strikes the author as overly pessimistic, 
since Taiwan‟s smart power seems too significant to resist it. 
 
As a retired senior naval officer put it, “Taiwan is a beautiful woman – with a gun in 
her purse” (Interview, May 13, 2010). 
 
6.2 Theoretical implications: limitations and further research 
 
Berenskoetter (2007: 17) holds that power is “a contest about shaping and being 
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 As noted before, the future development of Sino-US relations will be an important variable as well. 
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responsible for the future”, and in this contest, both hard and soft power play a part. 
Furthermore, this thesis suggests that in many situations, the leverage lies not either in 
the soft or in the hard, but in the interplay between the two. Such interplay may take 
many shapes. For example, a tangible power resource might work through a soft 
mechanism (attractive military), and conversely, intangible resources are perfectly able 
to work through hard mechanisms (democratic coercion). Listing more examples is 
unnecessary. Instead, it is interesting to look briefly at whether – and to what extent – 
the interplay outlined here applies to other cases than Taiwan. 
 
As mentioned in the methods section in chapter two, theory development is not a goal 
of this thesis. Still, it is probably not too bold to suggest (1) that smart power can be a 
helpful analytical framework for the study of power in international politics, and (2) 
that some of the issues raised above are highly relevant beyond the Taiwan Strait. 
Obviously, however, one has to be very careful not to assume that hard and soft power 
always interplay in the same way. For example, if someone were to use the 
relationship between military strength and soft power as a starting point for another 
case study, the Taiwanese debate about offensive and defensive weapons would 
certainly not translate automatically. To be sure, Taiwan is a quite unique case – in 
many respects – and the above should be analyzed against this backdrop. 
 
So, to finish off with some suggestions for further research, two main directions could 
be proposed. First, applying a smart power framework on other case studies would 
contribute to strengthening and refining the concept even further. Second, if staying in 
the Taiwan Strait, Lu (2007: 2) points out that one “need[s] to pay more attention to 
the context through which „resources‟ could turn into „influence‟ on a case-by-case 
basis”. That is, while this study has taken a quite wide-ranging approach, many of the 
smart power areas suggested would certainly make good case studies of their own. 
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